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ABSTRACT 
The Kenya Government expects the co-operative movement to 
play an extremely important role in agricultural development. But in 
spite of this expectation, the co-operative movement in Kenya has been 
faced by management problems, including corruption and misappropriation 
of funds, and by inefficiencies arising from the diseconomies of small-
scale. This study is mainly concerned with the latter problem, 
particularly as it affects the co-operative coffee factories of Kirinyaga 
district. Central Kenya. 
The study hypothesizes that the members of a co-operative 
coffee factory are better off by belonging to a large co-operative 
coffee factory than a smaller one. Hence, the members would be ill-
advised to disintegrate the co-operative processing system further by 
setting up individual processing facilities operating at very low 
throughput levels. 
Substantial benefits of both external and internal economies 
of scale accrue to the co-operative coffee factories as a result of 
increased volume of output of the societies, the KDCU and the factories 
themselves. 
Through economic analysis of costs, coffee quality, members' 
returns and size of factory, the optimum level of operation of a two-
disc co-operative coffee factory is found to be about 65 tonnes of clean 
coffee. This is smaller than the 80 tonnes suggested as the optimum 
capacity by the Ministry of Agriculture. But even then, only one out 
of the 36 factories studied operated at this lower level in 1969-70. 
(v) 
At optimal level of operation, only 28 factories would have 
been required to process the 1969-70 crop. For all the factories (44) 
to operate optimally, the district clean coffee average yield would 
need to be increased from the level of about .4 tonnes (in 1969-70) 
to .7 tonnes per hectare. By national standards this is still a 
"low" yield. 
In order to increase yields, and hence the factory through-
put, it is vital to have the co-operation of members. Society 
employees should be given an incentive to produce the high quality 
coffee that fetches substantially higher prices. If the higher 
prices are reflected in higher members' returns it will be an 
effective incentive for the members to increase their yields. As a 
result factories will operate closer to the optimum and the benefits 
of economies of scale will increase members' returns further. New 
factories, too, will be constructed once the average yield exceeds 
.70 tonnes of clean coffee per hectare. 
As a result of intensification of coffee farming and 
construction of new factories, new employment opportunities in the 
rural areas will arise and this will help to ease the severe 
unemplo3Tnent and underemployment problems facing Kenya at present. 
(vi) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Aim of the Study 
Agricultural co-operation is currently receiving a great deal 
of emphasis in development policy in many African countries. This idea 
has been expressed in various writings on development policy. Such 
writings include those of de Wilde (1967) and Hyden (1970). Hyden 
(in Hyden, et al, eds., 1970), for instance suggests: "African 
governments have for a variety of reasons found this co-operative 
philosophy (equitable ownership of shares) attractive." But what do 
the African governments expect of the co-operative movement? 
The governments look at co-operatives as "...a vital means 
of evoking among farmers a sense of participation and responsibility -
in marketing and processing farm products, in supplying requisites of 
production, in effecting improvements in crop and animal husbandry and 
in administering credit" (de wilde, 1967). The Kenya Government 
co-operative policy recognises that "quite apart from social and 
political factors there is no doubt that a strong co-operative movement 
would maximise the incomes of Kenya's peasant farmers by, on the one 
hand, performing essential functions of processing on a much larger and 
more efficient scale than would be possible for the individual grower, 
and on the other hand, giving him a share in the profits associated with 
these operations rather than letting them accrue entirely to private 
middle-men. A strong co-operative movement would also facilitate the 
expansion of agricultural credit and the technological progress associated 
with it, among other ways by simplifying the collection of loan repayments, 
through deduction of repayments from a borrower's crop proceeds at 
co-operative societies level." (Republic of Kenya, 1966). 
The Government is very optimistic of the success of co-operatives in 
playing the above roles because "co-operatives have direct roots in 
African traditions", although it recognises that "...their extensive 
use in the monetary sector of the economy will involve greater discipline 
and training than has heretofore been necessary" (Republic of Kenya, 1965). 
It is, therefore, apparent that the Government expects 
co-operation to perform a rural transformation through monetisation of the 
rural community. But the Government concedes the fact that the co-operative 
movement in Kenya, in spite of the past efforts by the Government, is not 
without problems. In addition to problems of mismanagement the Government 
realises that "members' receipts are also diminished by inefficiencies 
arising from the existence of a plethora of small mono-crop and mono-
purpose co-operative societies" (Republic of Kenya, 1966). 
All these phenomena, the development plan continues, act as a 
disincentive to farmers and result in both individual and national loss. 
The plan quotes a case in point where "the situation in the coffee 
industry has reached a point where many growers are clamouring individually 
or in small groups for permission to establish their own processing 
facilities on the ground that they stand to lose less through diseconomies 
of small-scale production than is currently withheld from them by the 
co-operative societies" (Republic of Kenya, 1966). But all the evidence 
points to there being very considerable economies of scale. In principle 
and in economic theory, as discussed below, this is accepted but, on the 
other hand, we have the members of primary societies pleading for the 
break up of existing societies because the members believe that their 
returns will increase if they have greater control over their own 
processing. The basic reasoning behind this argument is that any gains 
from economies of scale are in fact lost - indeed more than lost - by 
administrative inefficiency, graft and downright corruption of the societies, 
The hypothesis of this thesis, therefore, is that, in spite of 
the acknowledged inefficiencies arising from the co-operative organisation 
of the smallholder coffee industry in Kirinyaga district, the members of a 
co-operative coffee factory stand to gain more by belonging to a larger 
co-operative factory that operates near to capacity through their 
co-operative action in supplying such a factory adequately, than operating 
smaller individual coffee processing facilities in which they have direct 
control but which operates far below the optimal scale level. To state it 
more explicitly, this study hypothesises that the members' unit returns 
increase with the increasing output of a coffee factory processing their 
coffee and hence the optimal output level of a two disc coffee factory is 
far beyond what an individual or even a few smallholders could supply. 
The co-operative coffee factory members, therefore, would in general be 
ill-advised to press for the further fragmentation of the existing 
processing system because the relatively larger co-operative coffee 
factories would be more economically efficient. Essentially, the 
hypothesis focuses on the principle of economies of scale as it affects 
the economic efficiency of the co-operative coffee processing factories 
of Kirinyaga district. Central Kenya (see Maps 1 and 2). 
2. Economies of Scale 
There is a consensus of opinion on how the economies of scale 
arise. This is expressed ii a number of writings on the subject. For 
instance, Olson asserts, "internal economies of size come about largely 
through more complete utilization of lumpy factors" (Olson, 1956). 
Etherington (1971) expresses the same idea: "In general, economies of 
scale result because of some indivisibility in the production process." 
This, therefore, suggests that in the short run, economies of scale are 
mainly concerned with the Average Fixed Cost Curve (AFC) as shown in 
Figure 1.1. 
FIGURE 1.1 
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AFC is a rectangular hyperbola and declines continuously, 
approaching both axes asymptotically, as shown by points 1 and 2 in 
Figure 1.1. This is because as more units of output are produced, the 
average fixed costs fall proportionately. But to produce output using 
such a lumpy factor, variable costs have to be incurred as well. Average 
Variable Cost Curve (AVC) falls to a point where the per unit variable 
costs are equal to the marginal cost. This is at the point marked 4 in 
Figure 1.1, after which the AVC rises, with the Marginal Cost Curve (MC) 
above it, as the level of output is increased. 
In a production process, therefore, one is faced with both 
fixed and variable costs, and this is what makes the Average Total Cost 
Curve (ATC), in Figure 1.1, relevant. As the AVC falls along with the 
AFC down to point 4, the ATC falls rapidly. But as the AVC starts to 
rise, the fall of the ATC becomes more gradual and after point 3, where 
ATC is equal to MC, the ATC starts to rise. The ATC, therefore, falls 
as long as the AVC is either falling or its rise is not large enough to 
outweigh the fall in the AFC, otherwise the ATC rises (after point 3). 
In the long run, that is, "...a period long enough to permit 
each producer to make such technologically possible changes in the scale 
of his plant as he desires, and thus to vary his output either by a more 
or less intensive utilization of existing plant, or by varying the scale 
of his plant, or by some combination of these methods" (Viner, 1931), 
however, all the inputs are assumed to be variable. This is because 
"...an economic agent operates in the short run and plans in the long run" 
(Ferguson, C.E., 1972), and as such he may select any one of a wide variety 
of different investments. He is, thus, faced with a Long Run Average Cost 
Curve (LAC), rather than with short-run cost curves. An LAC, such as shown 
in Figure 1.2 below, is composed of many short run average cost curves 
(Viner, J., 1931). 
FIGURE 1.2 
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Before reaching the optimal output level, the average costs of 
a co-operative coffee processing factory should then fall as the output 
level of that factory is increased, ceteris paribus. This is 
represented by the region of the LA.C labelled "Economies of Scale" in 
Figure 1.2. Beyond the optimal level of operation, however, the unit 
costs, on the contrary, would rise as a result of increased level of 
output. This is the region of LAC labelled "Diseconomies of Scale" in 
Figure 1.2. A more detailed exposition of the theory of economies of 
scale will be presented in Chapter 3. 
It has already been pointed out that economies of scale, in 
general, result because of some indivisibility in the production process. 
In the smallholder coffee industry, the indivisibility in the production 
process involves mainly the processing, especially in Kenya where wet 
processing (explained in Chapter 3) is the only accepted process. 
There are also significant indivisibilities in marketing. Apart from 
these two highly lumpy processes, other benefits accrue to the farmers 
as a result of pooling their resources. These include relatively cheaper 
inputs through bulk-buying, the provision of more accessible credit by 
use of their collective borrowing power and, as the Kenya Government 
explicitly notes, because of the reduction in risk in loan repayments 
resulting from deduction of repayments from a borrower's crop proceeds 
at co-operative society level (Republic of Kenya, 1966). Each of these 
processes is briefly discussed here below but a more detailed discussion 
will be presented in Chapter 3. 
A one-disc coffee factory requires an initial investment of * 
more than K.shs.65,000 (District Coffee Officer - private communication 
on initial construction cost of Kiburi factory), and will at least need 
to be supplied by 40 hectares (100 acres) of coffee (de Wilde, 1967). 
* Kenva shillings 10 = 1 Australian dollar and K.shs.20 = K£l. 
For coffee farmers, such as in Kirinyaga, with an average coffee hectarage 
of 0.2, it will take about 200 fanners to supply the "mini-factory". 
De Wilde gives a range of 100 to 250 farmers, and the figure for Kirinyaga 
is well within the range. The only alternative, other than co-operating, 
each of these farmers has, is drying his coffee unpulped and selling it as 
"Buni". This would mean a loss in both quality and revenue. It is, 
therefore, felt that the farmers should get together in even larger numbers 
than 200 to construct coffee processing factories which are even Inrju-r 
than the mini-factories, mentioned above, usually two-disc factories. 
Other than processing, marketing of coffee has made co-operation 
almost inescapable for the small-scale coffee farmers. The coffee 
processing units have to assemble coffee at the railway stations or 
deliver it to the Kenya Planters Co-operative Union (KPCU) Mills in Nairobi. 
This would have been more expensive for individual farmers due to the 
small quantities that they would be transporting. The need to make a 
saving in transport costs has, in fact, forced all the processing 
factories in each of the administrative zones to combine at a higher level 
into co-operative societies. In addition to transport, the KPCU mill 
out-turn fee is fixed regardless of the quantity of clean coffee delivered, 
and there is thus substantial saving in costs per unit of output when 
relatively larger quantities are delivered. 
Other than undertaking the functions of processing and marketing 
the coffee co-operatives provide inputs at relatively lower prices than 
in the local retail stores. This is made possible through bulk-buying 
of fertilizers, spraying chemicals, processing materials and any other 
inputs required by the members. This process has been centralised beyond 
the co-operative societies level by the formation of the District 
Co-operative Union (DCU) of which the primary societies are members. 
Another function that has been centralised to the DCU level is 
the provision of short-term credit for the co-operative members. The DCU 
acts as an agent of the Co-operative Bank of Kenya (CBK) in granting loans 
to the co-operative members and in collecting repayments. Recruitment 
and employment of the graded staff in all primary societies and the 
processing unit level is a function of the DCU. A more detailed discussion 
of how economies of scale arise in the coffee processing will be presented 
in Chapter 3. 
3. The Data 
The data used in this study were collected from the following 
sources: 
(a) The annual reports of the District Co-operative Officer (DCO), 
and also from the co-operative movement surveys undertaken by 
the Department of the Co-operative Development (DCD). 
(b) The Kirinyaga District Co-operative Union (KDCU) reports 
submitted to the District Coffee Extension Officer (DCEO) 
in the District Agricultural Office. These were mainly on 
processing and the production side of the co-operative 
movement. The financial reports were submitted to the DCO 
and were available to the author. 
(c) KDCU files on matters not reported in the above reports. 
These were found very helpful in the cross-checking of the 
figures presented in the various reports. 
(d) The annual reports of the DCEO were also very helpful 
especially in production and processing of coffee. 
(e) Lastly, some information and ideas on the coffee co-operatives 
were gathered through discussions with the DCEO, DCO, KDCU 
Manager and other officials, especially the Education Secretary, 
society Secretary Managers, committee and ordinary members. 
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Most of the available records were incomplete for crop years 
before and after 1969-70. This, therefore, means that this study is 
limited to figures of a single crop year, and this constitutes the main 
limitation of this study. In 1969-70, however, the district marketed 
only 1746 tonnes of clean coffee as compared to 4400 tonnes in 1966-67, 
which was a peak year. 1969-70, therefore, was far below the peak year 
due to drought and an attack on coffee by the Coffee Berry Disease (CBD). 
The study is, therefore, based on a dismal year and it is, tims, a 
pessimistic rather than an optimistic one. 
4. Policy Implications if the Hypothesis is Confirmed 
If the profit (which is the potential members' returns) is 
found to increase significantly with the increasing throughput of the 
factories, the members would be advised that in spite of the existing 
inefficiencies in the co-operative coffee processing factories and the 
societies in general, they should not break off from these processing 
units to set up their individual processing facilities because they 
stand to lose, if they do, through diseconomies of small-scale 
coffee processing. 
Before testing the hypothesis, however, a review of literature 
on the history of co-operation, including the Rochdale Principles of 
co-operation and their relevance to the co-operative movement in Kenya, 
and the history of coffee in Kenya will be presented in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3 the general theory on the principle of economies of scale 
and its reference to the coffee industry in Kenya will be discussed. 
In Chapter 4, the economic model which will be used to test the hypothesis 
and its statistical verification will be discussed, whereas the various 
technical recommendations that should be adhered to in order to produce 
high quality clean coffee will be discussed in Chapter 5. Conclusions and 
policy implications drawn from the study will be presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
KENYA'S CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT - THE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. A Brief History of Co-operation: 
The World Perspective 
There have always been instances in the history of human society 
where individuals have come together to achieve certain aims in 
co-operation with others. These common efforts, suggests Helm (1968), 
were usually directed at fulfilling a certain temporary need. But "the 
rise and expansion of the modern co-operative movement has its roots in 
the far-reaching economic, social and political changes which took place 
in Europe in the late eighteenth and all through the nineteenth century, 
especially the Industrial Revolution and the liberation of peasantry from 
the former feudalistic system" (ibid). 
Consequent to the above changes, the farmers in the rural areas 
became increasingly indebted to usurious money-lenders as the need to buy 
factor inputs for cultivation of cash crops and pay taxes arose. "The 
resulting social unrest and insecurity provided a fertile ground for ideas 
for a new social and economic order". But as Helm suggests, in spite of 
these favourable conditions the co-operative movement would scarcely 
have grown fast were it not for a group of devoted philanthropists, 
politicians, church-men and civil servants who promoted co-operation by 
instilling general enthusiasm for its ideals or by showing the way through 
practical examples. 
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The credit in England for an upspring of a consumers' movement, 
which had its first success in the venture of Rochdale pioneers, started 
in 188A, and subsequently spread all over the world, goes to Robert Owen 
(1771-1858) and Dr William King (1786-1865). The agricultural co-operative 
movement, however, started in Germany in the form of credit, supply and 
marketing rural co-operation, initiated by Wilhem Raiffsen (1818-1888) 
and Wilhem Haas (1839-1913). Similar efforts were made in France, 
Ireland and Scandinavian countries at about the same time. "The motives 
of these early co-operators were based either on the mere feeling of 
Christian or humanitarian responsibility of a man faced by the misery of 
his fellow men...or on the political mainstreams of their time". 
From India, where co-operation was introduced by the British 
Colonial Administration at the turn of the twentieth century, it spread 
to other parts of Asia and in the 1920s to East Africa. Following the 
disintegration of the colonial rule after 1945 and the achievement of 
independence of the many newly-emerging nations, the co-operative movement 
has extended to nearly all parts of Africa and Asia. 
The Kenyan Perspective 
The first co-operatives were organised in Kenya before the First 
World War to market the products of European Farmers (Republic of Kenya, 
1966). Owing to Kenya's peculiar colonial situation, however, it was 
not until 1945 that a Co-operative Societies Ordinance provided for the 
establishment of co-operatives among the African smallholders, and in 
sharp contrast the first African co-operative in Tanzania, the Kilimanjaro 
Native Co-operative Union, was formed in 1932 (Hayden, 1970). Under the 
1945 Co-operative Societies Ordinance, about 1000 societies had been 
registered by 1966 (Republic of Kenya, 1966). 
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Following the women's co-operative groups, "Egg Circles", 
established in Nyanza for buying and selling eggs, a Registrar of 
Co-operative Societies was established by the colonial administration, 
but even then the Government was very hesitant in supporting the 
establishment and expansion of co-operatives in other areas. Hyden 
points out that the Registrar had a conflicting role of assisting 
co-operatives and advising the African traders, the very middle-men 
the co-operatives sought to circumvent (Hyden, 1971). In addition, 
the more influential Africans who aspired to be traders, regarded 
co-operation as a government attempt to stifle African business 
initiative and hence pressure against co-operation among Africans 
mounted (ibid). 
An upsurge of registration of African co-operative societies 
followed the colonial government's introduction of cash crop production 
among African smallholders in the latter half of the 1950s. A lesson on 
benefits arising from co-operative handling of smallholder coffee had 
already been demonstrated by the Arabica coffee of the Mount Kilimanjaro 
slopes in Tanzania, handled by the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union 
(Swynnerton, 1954). This plan to intensify the development of African 
cash crop farming clearly stated: "It is most important to establish a 
strong co-operative organization to weld the very large numbers of small 
producers into a corporate body and to collect their produce into a bulk 
and quality which will command the interest of buyers and markets, 
commanding a preferential demand over 'penny packets' of variable quality" 
(ibid). Co-operative coffee factories, in particular, were promoted as 
a technical measure to handle more efficiently the small quantities 
marketed by the African producers (Hyden, 1970). Another spurt in 
co-operative registration followed after independence in 1963, resulting 
from the settlement of about 30,000 African families in the former 
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"White Highlands". Other co-operatives were formed for the purpose of 
buying large European farms (ibid). Details on the co-operative 
movement of Kirinyaga are presented in Appendix 6. 
This rapid government-monitored development was not without 
its inherent problems. These included the inexperience of the committee 
and ordinary members of the societies, inadequate training of staff to 
match the fast development, and other management problems making difficult 
the efficient operation of these societies. These difficulties have taken 
their toll of the co-operative movement because only about half of the 
1783 societies registered by 1967 were operational (ibid). But all the 
same, "...notwithstanding their very real difficulties, the co-operatives 
have frequently been the only link peasants have had with the monetary 
sector of the economy and for this reason alone they continue to sustain 
their interest" (ibid). The situation has also been slightly improved 
by the Government's provision of increased training facilities and 
supervision aimed at minimising mismanagement at society level. A more 
detailed discussion of the difficulties facing the co-operative movement 
in Kenya and the efforts being taken to solve them will be presented later 
in this chapter during the discussion of the contemporary situation of the 
co-operative movement in Kenya. 
Since the main concern of this thesis is the coffee 
co-operative movement of Kirinyaga district, it will be helpful to 
give a brief history of the coffee industry in Kenya. 
2. A Brief History of the Kenya Coffee Industry 
The date of introduction of coffee to Kenya is disputable but 
most sources of information indicate that it was on or around 1900. 
Rowe (1963), suggests that the planting of Arabica coffee began at the 
beginning of this century, while Matheson (1950) points out that through 
missionary involvement by 1909 there was extensive development. 
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Walters (undated), on the other hand, says that Arabica coffee was 
"...brought into Kenya successfully in about 1894 from the neighbouring 
German East Africa by the Missionaries...[and] from 1910 onwards coffee 
was a major export of the country". Krug (1968), however, suggests 
that coffee was first planted in Kenya around 1900. In Kenya and Coffee 
publication (1965), it is thought that the coffee plant was introduced 
into Kenya in 1893 by Paterson, on behalf of the Scotch Mission at 
Kibwezi, but the majority of the present plantations originated from the 
seed of Coffea arabica first grown at St Austins in 1901. The seed 
planted in St. Austins is said to have been brought up from Kibwezi by 
Dr. Eoedeker and James MacQueen in 1896 (Wanyonyi, et al, March 1969). 
All the sources, therefore, suggest that coffee was introduced 
into Kenya on or around 1900 from Tanzania, specifically Bagamayo, to 
Kibwezi and then to St. Austins where the seed was multiplied and seedings 
sold to the European settlers. 
The planting continued until the depression of the mid-1930s 
and developed into estates owned entirely by Europeans. It was not until 
the 1930s that the Africans were allowed to plant coffee (Rowe, 1963). 
But even then the introduction was confined to three isolated areas, on an 
experimental basis - Kisii, Meru and Embu (Wallace, 1972). 
The first problem that faced the European coffee industry was 
that of labour shortage and one official of the Government who was an 
administrator in the coffee areas, sums up the labour problem saying: 
"A chronic cause of dissatisfaction on the side of the settlers was the 
shortage of native labour. The native was not yet accustomed to wage 
earning, and the European had not learned to make it attractive to him. 
The tendency was to look to administrative officers to persuade or coerce 
the natives into going to work and we were expected to preach the gospel 
of labour in all occasions. There was a good deal of futile talk of 
teaching Africans the dignity of labour, but it was hardly exemplified 
in practice" (Walters, undated). 
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To persuade the Africans to provide their labour for wages, the 
Africans had to pay tax and also labour offices were established. With 
booming prices before World War I, "it seemed certain that the future lay 
with the large coffee plantations owned by Europeans but worked by 
unskilled native labour for whom few alternative occupations were allowed 
to develop" (ibid). 
In 1923, the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Devonshire, stated 
that the British Government held Kenya in trust for the native African 
population, "whose interests must be regarded as paramount" (ibid). He 
felt that the non-African population of Kenya appeared to be paying 
considerably less than its share of the tax revenue of the colony. He 
was, therefore, the first major government figure to question "the 
assumption that the importation of European settlers was the best way, 
from an economic and a social standpoint, to develop the colony" (ibid). 
But it was several years before coffee was considered a possible cash 
crop in the African areas. 
In 1934, coffee nurseries were established in African areas 
(Kisii, Embu and Meru, as indicated earlier). It was, no sooner, 
claimed that the Africans did not demonstrate eagerness to plant coffee 
but, as Walters suggests, this was understandable when one considers the 
restraints put upon the Africans with respect to planting and also due to 
low prices emanating from the depression of the 1930s which hit the Kenya 
coffee considerably (ibid). Another reason was that the areas allowed 
to plant coffee were far off from European coffee growing areas, perhaps 
to protect the European industry, already enjoying a good name abroad, 
from the allegedly ill-effects that would result from the would-be poorly 
grown African coffee and also the resultant labour shortage. Also, 
"African grown coffee was first developed far away from the small existing 
money oriented markets, and its acceptance was inhibited initially by 
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by cultural and economic tradition" (ibid). The smallholder coffee 
sector grew very slowly until after the Second World War, and even then 
it was only allowed to develop under tight control by the Department of 
Agriculture and continual pressure from the plantation owners. 
Although there was wider introduction of coffee growing in most 
of the Native Reserves in suitable areas during the early years of the 
1950s, the real movement of the coffee industry did not really get going 
until the launching of what is commonly referred to as the Swynnerton Plan 
of 17 May 1954. Its commencement was initiated at a meeting held on 
24 September 1953 with the Provincial Commissioners at Government House. 
It was agreed that "it would be necessary to develop schemes to provide 
employment for Kikuyu repatriates both in the Reserves and on development 
projects, having as their main objective the raising of the agricultural 
productivity and the human and stock-carrying capacity of the land. At 
the same time, the Government has decided to draw up a plan for accelerated 
agricultural development of the Native Land Units in the other Provinces 
in Kenya" (Swynnerton, 1954). 
Following this plan there was a defined cash crop policy, 
calling for a vigorous program for the expansion of cash crop growing 
by Africans. The plan had these main safeguards: 
(i) Cash crops had to be developed as part and parcel of a 
balanced mixed farming system. This assured the food supply 
to the family until such a time as they won a big enough 
return from their cash crops; 
(ii) A diversification program had to be adopted to shield the 
people from considerably adverse effects of depression, 
pests or diseases or their own apathy or general inability 
to cope with such a new and a relatively difficult crop, 
once the driving force of European supervision had been 
partially removed; 
18 
(iii) The plan insisted upon continued enforcement of sound 
cultural practices and planting within the approved and 
suitable ecological zones• This, the plan suggests, 
was the only means by which the price recessions, pest 
and disease attacks could be withstood. 
Through use of such conditions, the plan noted, the African coffee 
average yields over 4 years of 9 cwt of clean coffee per acre with 
extremely good classification had been achieved in Meru, which compares 
more than favourably with the Chagga of Kilimanjaro or the Kenya European 
coffee grower operating under less favourable conditions because Meru was 
an above-average coffee growing area. Although the number of trees 
approved for each farmer was strictly controlled, the plan notes that the 
progressive farmer must not be unduly held up in planting the full 
acreage which he could manage with his family or hired labour. The 
phased development of coffee and other cash crops is shown in Appendix 1. 
The coffee target was exceeded as shown by Appendix 2, and all the crop 
was handled by the co-operatives. 
By 1965, and in fact in 196A (Wallace, 1972), the total 
smallholder coffee, sometimes referred to as the co-operative sector, 
had exceeded the estates total, as shown by Appendix 2. The production, 
however, did not exceed that of the estates, because of a very high 
proportion of young coffee, until 1968-69 crop year when the co-operative 
sector marketed 23,264 tonnes of clean coffee as compared to 22,343 tonnes 
marketed by the estates. The hectarage in the co-operative sector, 
however, had by then increased to 54,984 while that of the estates had 
fallen to 30,690, to give Kenya a total of 85,675 hectares of coffee 
(Kenya Coffee, January 1971). The co-operative sector coffee is grown 
by about 300,000 growers and is processed and marketed by about 155 
co-operative societies (ibid). Other than processing and marketing of 
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smallholder coffee, the co-operatives provide for factor inputs such as 
fertiliser, spray chemicals on credit, and also give short-term production 
loans to the members as an agent of the Kenya Co-operative Bank (KCB). 
It has already been pointed out that the European settlers feared 
that coffee quality would fall with the introduction of coffee to the 
African smallholders but, as Appendix 4 shows, it actually improved. The 
reason given for such an improvement was the young coffee in the small-
holder sector (Clayton, 1964), but as the trees get relatively older, 
the quality appears to be falling, as shown by the classification of 
Kirinyaga in Appendix 5. This may be as a result of relaxed supervision 
by the Government but even then the present coffee quality is slightly 
higher than of the estates although it is feared the quality may drop 
further. Supervision and education of co-operative factory employees 
would be able to save the coffee quality, as well as member education 
to ensure high quality coffee cherry is delivered to the co-operative 
factories. A discussion of crop husbandry techniques and processing 
procedures and their effects on quality and yields will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Now that the history of the coffee industry in Kenya has 
been presented, it is necessary to discuss the contemporary situation 
of the coffee co-operatives within the co-operative movement in Kenya. 
3. The Contemporary Situation in Kenya 
The structure of African co-operatives in Kenya reflects the 
agricultural characteristics of the various provinces. The main farming 
provinces. Central, Eastern and Nyanza, have the largest number of active 
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marketing societies. These market mainly coffee in Eastern and Central 
provinces whereas they market cotton, sugar and pyrethrum, including some 
coffee in Nyanza. In both Central and Nyanza provinces, one out of every 
nine persons belongs to a co-operative. Assuming a family average of six, 
therefore, about two-thirds of all farmers in these provinces are 
co-operative members (Hyden, 1970). In Kirinyaga, the proportion of total 
population which is composed of the co-operative members is also about 
two-thirds but one cannot say for sure because although the DCO annual 
report (1970) indicated that there are 37,047 persons who are members of 
the co-operative movement, the true figure is much lower because some of 
the members belong to two or even three co-operative societies. For 
example, most of the coffee co-operative members are also members of the 
dairy co-operatives. Some of the members of the cotton societies are 
also members of the Mwea Consumers and also Mwea Savings and Credit 
Societies (see Appendix 6). 
The other provinces, too, have their share, though relatively 
smaller, in the co-operative movement. In the Western province, a quarter 
of the co-operatives market coffee, while several of them "...market 
cereals and grain, especially maize, since Western Province produces more 
than half of the national maize output of Kenyan smallholders. However, 
the maize marketing societies do not generally rest on a sound economic 
base and turnover very often fails to cover overhead costs while revenue 
accruing from maize marketing is rather low" (ibid). The real function of 
the Maize Marketing Co-operatives, in Western province, is to centralise 
the marketing of the smallholder maize to the Maize and Produce Board (MPB) 
and also give, on credit, factor inputs to their members. Rift Valley 
province has a number of marketing co-operatives, established in conjunction 
with the recent settlement policy in the former "White Highland" after 
1963 (ibid). In the Coast province, however, Hyden points out, only one 
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out of thirty-two persons belongs to the co-operative movement, but there 
is a wide variation among the districts in the province. Taita district, 
for instance, matches Central and Nyanza provinces, while only one out 
of 247 persons belongs to a co-operative in Kilifi. The North-Eastern 
province has only one small co-operative while Nairobi has a number of 
consumer and credit and savings co-operatives (ibid). 
In Kenya, there were 1,990 registered co-operatives in 1970, 
and 300 were either under liquidation or inquiry, while a further 300 
were inactive (Daily Nation, June 1970). A 1972 survey, however, shows 
that there are 1464 primary societies, most of them grouped into 39 
co-operative unions. The societies and unions are members of the Kenya 
National Federation of Co-operatives (KNFC) which is the national or 
apex organisation (Kenya Agricultural Sector Survey, 1972). 
It has already been pointed out that 600 out of the 1990 
co-operatives in 1970, which is about 30 per cent, were on the "black 
list". This clearly shows that there are problems confronting the 
co-operative movement and its development. The extent to which the 
co-operative movement is affected by the problems varies considerably. 
On the one extreme are the cotton co-operatives which are almost at 
a point of collapse and commenting on credit to their members, the 
Development Plan (1966) notes that they are "...at present in no 
position to play such a role". On the other extreme are the coffee 
and pyrethrum co-operatives and the plan notes that the Government 
does not see the weakness of these co-operatives as a very serious 
obstacle to progress in the coffee and pyrethrum industries 
(Republic of Kenya, 1966). This variability between the performances 
of the individual co-operatives even extends to the next development 
plan (1969) and even to the present time. The plan notes: "Within 
the co-operative movement,... there has been considerable variability 
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between the performances of individual organizations. However, while some 
co-operatives have been efficiently managed, too often the reverse has 
been the case" (Republic of Kenya, 1969). In Kirinyaga, all the seven 
coffee co-operatives were found "well-run" and were the only ones in the 
district which qualified for the Co-operative Bank of Kenya Credit. 
Only 120 co-operative societies in the whole country were initially 
recruited by the CBK in 1968 to take part in the short-term co-operative 
credit scheme because they were "sufficiently well managed to permit the 
Co-operative Bank to consider issuing them with loans without undue risk" 
(Republic of Kenya, 1969). 
4. Problems Confronting the Co-operative Movement in Kenya 
Co-operatives in Kenya face a number of obstacles which limit 
their effectiveness and reduce their attractiveness to the existing and 
potential members. These difficulties are vividly described in the 1966-70 
Development Plan and the following discussion is a review of the plan. 
Firstly, the plan suggests that the rapid increase in turnover 
resulting from the rapidly rising output by members, outstripped the 
existing societies' accounting and financial control procedures, resulting 
in gross misappropriation of funds. For instance, at the end of 1965, 
40 per cent of the 146 coffee co-operative societies had not completed 
their accounts for the year ending in 1964, and thirteen societies were 
delinquent for the previous year as well. The Minister for Co-operatives 
and Social Services threatened to liquidate co-operatives failing to meet 
his deadline for submission of audited accounts for the 1969 financial 
year (Daily Nation, June 1970). 
Kirinyaga Co-operative Movement is no different to the rest 
of the nation's movement because at the end of 1970 the DCO report indicated 
that some co-operatives had been audited last in 1967 (see Appendix 6). 
Resulting from the misappropriation of funds, mentioned above, 
and in the case of coffee co-operatives, involvement in speculative 
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investments with members' proceeds, a shockingly small share of total 
sales reached the members - down to even 50 per cent in some societies. 
In Kirinyaga the coffee society that was the worst off, in 1969-70, paid 
62.5 per cent of the total sales to members, slightly better off than 
the 50 per cent paid by some coffee societies in Kenya, but far short 
of the government recommendation of 80 per cent. 
Secondly, the plan points out the inefficiencies arising from 
the existence of small societies, resulting in relatively low members' 
receipts. Thirdly, a frequent breakdown of the grading system in coffee 
societies results in low quality coffee which is a loss to individual 
members and the nation as a whole. Committee members and relatives 
demand top grading for otherwise inferior cherry and the cherry inspectors 
are not in a position to refuse. The author has himself reprimanded cherry 
inspectors on this issue and on two occasions asked members to re-grade 
cherry approved for delivery. These difficulties of the co-operative 
movement, in one way or another, diminish members' returns and hence 
their incentives to grow the relevant crops and contribute labour and 
other inputs required to obtain a quality product. In either way, 
both the nation and the members lose, and the Government has, therefore, 
engaged itself in an improvement program of the co-operative movement. 
To control mismanagement and efficiencies arising from the small 
size of co-operatives, in 1966 a new Co-operative Societies Act was brought 
into effect (Republic of Kenya, 1969). This Act gave the Commissioner for the 
Co-operative Department increased regulatory powers over co-operative 
societies, which include financial control, liquidation and amalgamation. 
The Commissioner could also insist on primary societies being affiliated to 
a co-operative union; he could insist on resignation of inefficient 
committees and replace them with committees of his choice for a period of 
one year. Although these measures are not to be applied indiscriminately. 
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when a society is organised inefficiently, the Commissioner steps in to 
improve the performance (Republic of Kenya, 1969). 
The Government has also increased the training facilities of 
co-operative employees, committee and ordinary members, as well as the 
Department of Co-operative staff. These are trained in the co-operative 
college of Kenya (CCK) and the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), 
Kirinyaga coffee co-operatives enrolled 29 trainees in CCK and 2 in KIA 
in 1969-70 crop year. Some courses were also held in Kianyaga Farmers 
Training Centre (FTC); Table 2.1 below shows the breakdown of the course. 
Most of the FTC courses were, and still are, an effort of DCEO and DCO. 
TABLE 2.1 
COFFEE COURSES ATTENDANCE - KIANYAGA FTC - 1970 
Number of 
Courses 
Attendance Participants 
4 146 Coffee farmers 
5 201 Coffee field committee 
members 
3 94 Coffee Factory Managers 
4 84 KDCU staff 
16 525 -
Source; Principal,Kianyaga FTC. Annual Report - 1970. 
In addition to the training program, Nordic advisers give on-the-
job training in financial control and administration, including credit 
administration, while some of them run courses in CCK. The Government 
has also made it possible for the societies to extend credit facilities 
to their members by the establishment of the Co-operative Bank of Kenya 
(CBK). In Kirinyaga, K.shs.454,571.40 was lent to the members of the 
societies from the CBK through their societies. The CBK has a branch 
in the district headquarters, Kerugoya. 
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Although the Government seems committed to the success of the 
co-operative movement, the increasing government intervention has been 
met with mounting resentment by the committee members and the co-operative 
employees. In Kirinyaga, some see the DCO and his staff as intruders and 
abusive verbal exchanges have been witnessed. The countersigning of 
cheques and approval of any orders by the DCO has caused heated debates, 
especially between the KDCU Manager and the DCO. Although it has been a 
point of consensus shared by nearly all the government officials in the 
district that there should be some financial control measures enforced 
by the DCO, most of them feel that these should be relaxed as the society 
officials become more experienced and responsible. But, if anything, 
the control is being tightened as the DCO endeavours to enforce nearly 
every single clause in the December 1966 Co-operative Act, although the 
Act points out that all the clauses should not be enforced indiscriminately. 
The control should be phased out. 
5. Rochdale Principles of Co-operation and Their Relevance to Kenya 
Owing to the flexibility of its organisation, easily adaptable 
to a variety of different purposes and widely diverging economic and 
social systems, the definition of a co-operative society and the principles 
that should govern its operation and organisation has been difficult to 
find (Helm, 1968). There are three main schools of thought: 
First, the Co-operative Enterprise School which sees the 
primary objective of a co-operative society as the advancement 
of the members' economic interests, and protecting and 
maintaining the economic independence of the small entrepreneur 
and farmer by balancing economic weakness through pooling of 
resources, and thus achieving economies of scale (ibid). It is 
apparent that the co-operators are then out to improve their 
individual economic position in a competitive situation. 
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Secondly, the Co-operative Commonwealth School, which in addition 
to improving members' economic position, has a long term objective 
to eliminate the competitive, capitalistic system and replace it 
by an economic system based on mutual co-operation (ibid). This 
school of thought has a leaning towards socialism. 
Thirdly, the Socialist Co-operative School is based on the 
Marxist-Leninist theory that co-operatives can be an important 
step in socialist progress. A co-operative society under this 
school of thought could be defined as an "...economic and 
social organisation of the working people, serving not only 
the interests of the members, but also social progress" (ibid). 
As co-operators desperately struggle to promote their respective schools 
of thought, only a minority of co-operators have subscribed to the more 
liberal views of Professor W. Preuss and Bernhard Lavergue that 
"...co-operation includes 'free' co-operatives which determine their 
oxm economic policy, as well as state operated co-operatives with 
fixed economic targets under overall government planning" (ibid). 
With the level of supervision and government intervention, 
already discussed, Kenya's co-operatives tend to fall in the latter 
category of state operated co-operatives. Their formation, especially 
the coffee ones on which the study will concentrate, was promoted by the 
Government when the centralised co-operative coffee processing facilities 
were recommended as the only means of handling the African smallholders' 
coffee. One cannot opt to leave his society because he owns less than 
a hectare of coffee and cannot run economically a factory that has a 
capacity of more than seventy-five hectares, let alone being able to 
construct the factory involving an investment of about K.shs.200,000.00. 
But even if one is free to choose among the societies, the proximity of a 
processing factory to his coffee plot is a major factor in his choice. 
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and consequently he becomes a member of the society running a processing 
factory nearest to his coffee plot. 
In spite of the government intervention into the co-operative 
movement, Kenya's co-operatives are closest to the Co-operative Enterprise 
School than any other. This ...s not surprising because the originators of 
the Kenya co-operative movement, British Colonial Administration, are 
traditional subscribers to the Co-operative Enterprise School. 
But whatever school of thought they may adhere to, co-operative 
societies follow certain principles adopted to lay the foundation of 
co-operative action and these distinguish a co-operative society from 
other types of businesses. Until recently, these fundamental principles 
of co-operation have been those established by the Rochdale pioneers. 
They include: 
(a) open membership, 
(b) democratic control, 
(c) limited interest on shares, 
(d) patronage rebates, 
(e) goods to be sold at current market rate 
and for cash only, 
(f) neutrality in race, religion and politics, 
(g) sale of pure and unadulterated goods, and 
(h) continuous education of members. 
All these principles, however, are not applicable because they were 
based on consumer co-operation and some have become out of date in some 
respects owing to certain recent developments within the movement 
(Helm, 1968). Also to make them more applicable to both the developing 
and socialist countries, agreement has been reached to limit the principles 
to the first four Rochdale principles, retaining (f) and (h) as 
recommendations. But even then, controversies on the subject continue 
(ibid). 
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(a) Open Membership 
This principle provides for the free entry and exit into a 
co-operative. As already indicated above, there exists a form of 
compulsory cooperation in Kenya's coffee industry. Opting to leave 
one's society means either giving up coffee growing or joining a more 
distant co-operative, which means higher costs of transport to the 
farmer. But although one cannot be refused entry on the grounds of 
his creed, race or political convictions, the society has the power to 
exercise selective measures, as laid down in the by-laws. In Kirinyaga 
these include an entry fee of K.shs.25.00 and a share capital of 
K.shs.100.00 in coffee societies. This sets the minimum standard for 
the economic capacity of the member. In addition the by-laws of the 
coffee societies limit the membership to areas of residence (mainly 
location), land ownership and to persons of sound mind. The by-laws 
also provide for the banning of a member's produce if he fails to meet 
the required standards so as to produce a uniformly "high quality 
product". This is usually enforced by the society field committee. 
The ban is revoked once the member concerned rectifies the situation. 
(b) Democratic Control 
Self-administration of the society should be based on the 
equality of all members as opposed to other forms of business where the 
influence on decision-making is related to the amount of capital invested 
(ibid). The supreme decision-making body is the assembly of its 
members, the General Meeting (GM). The GM elects from its members a 
smaller decision-making body, the Society Executive Committee. All the 
members have equal voting rights and can stand for office, although the 
voting right may, for example, be subject to certain regulations such 
as the paid-up share capital. 
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In very large societies, however, members tend to show a 
feeling of apathy and indifference towards their societies and, as a 
consequence, the extent to which they can exercise the democratic 
control becomes questionable. Some members of the committee lack the 
necessary knowledge and if such members are the majority the decision-
making process becomes very slow, on the one hand, or the few members 
of the committee who are knowledgeable steer the decision-making, on the 
other. Both of these are detrimental to the well-being and success of 
the society. A shining example in Kirinyaga is the role the teachers 
have played in the co-operative movement. Being the only well-educated 
people in the rural areas at the inception of the movement in the 1950s, 
and also participating in agriculture, they took up the senior positions 
in the society executive committees. They have managed to influence the 
co-operative policy considerably, and they apparently must have had more 
than their, supposedly, one vote in the decision-making and the democratic 
control has apparently suffered. This situation could be rectified by 
member education in the decision-making process. 
(c) Limited Interest on Capital and Patronage Rebates 
These two principles are mainly concerned with the distribution 
of profits and surpluses. In co-operative societies, any excess income 
is divided between allocations to the reserve fund and distribution to 
the members (ibid). 
In Kirinyaga, the allocation to the reserve fund (society 
surplus) is considerably greater relative to what is distributed to 
members during what is referred to as "final payment",in coffee 
societies. The rate of repayment of the patronage refund is 
determined by: 
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p R = — where R = Rate of payment per kilogram of coffee cherry, c 
P = Total distributable profits, and 
C = Total kilograms of cherry delivered. 
The share capital in Kirinyaga coffee co-operatives does not earn any 
interest and on a member's withdrawal from the co-operative it is only 
his share, K.shs.100.00, that is refunded and he even forfeits his entry 
fee of K.shs.25.00. 
(d) Service at Cost 
Helm suggests: "Even though this principle underlies the 
business policy of co-operative societies and their mode of operation, 
and distinguishes them from other forms of private business, it is often 
not expressly mentioned" (ibid). Robotka refers to this principle as 
"one of the basic tenets of co-operation" (Robotka, 1947). Involved in 
this idea, he continues, is the fact that members authorise the society 
to incur and assess against them only the actual costs of serving them. 
Hence, Robotka concludes, a co-operative cannot realise a profit nor 
incur a loss. 
It is, however, a point of common consensus today that in excess 
of the current total expenditure, a co-operative should be allowed some 
self-finance to enable future expansion and modernisation (Helm, 1968). 
This excess, usually called surplus rather than profit has been used as 
a reason in diminishing members' returns, but if used in items other than 
expansion and modernisation of society's productive facilities, it could 
be regarded as profit rather than surplus. 
It should be noted that anything reducing the members' returns 
below sales less costs target would be invalidating the principle. It is 
members' returns per hectare of coffee owned that demonstrates to them 
the relative advantages of a joint action - usually referred to as the 
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"co-operative effect". It is the economic result of joint action and 
is at a potential maximum when costs per unit of output are lowest. 
This is at the optimal level of operation and to make best use of the 
benefits of joint action, usually referred to as benefits of economies of 
scale, it would be necessary to operate at the optimal level. 
The co-operative effect is usually reflected in the greater 
degree of satisfaction and fulfilment of the members' economic needs, 
otherwise the joint action is not worthy. In case of voluntary HOC let LEU, 
an individual joins a co-operative if the co-operative effect is significant 
enough to compensate for the disadvantages of membership, for instance, 
the initial share contribution, liability resulting from membership and 
the general obligation to the society which limits the members' freedom of 
action (Helm, 1968). The co-operative effect in the case of coffee 
co-operative societies of Kirinyaga has been achieved by pooling individual 
resources, thus enjoying the benefits of economies of scale, and this will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
(e) Neutrality in Race, Religion and Politics 
Emphasis of neutrality in race, religion and politics,"...aims 
at the inner unity of the co-operative society, and beyond that of the 
co-operative movement as a whole by keeping aloof from all racial, religious 
and political controversies and by avoiding partisanship on these issues, 
with the exception of those which would threaten the existence of the 
co-operative organizations" (ibid). 
Most of the first co-operatives in Kenya were organised on 
racial lines but in the mid-1950s the Kenya Planters' Co-operative Union 
(KPCU) accepted the African coffee societies as members. Today, however, 
apart from the KPCU and the Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA) which are 
still dominated by Europeans, the initially European co-operatives have 
substantially Africanised their membership, and co-operatives are no 
32 
longer organised on racial lines (Hyden, 1970). All the same, all 
coffee co-operatives in Kirinyaga are wholly African because all the 
coffee in Kirinyaga is grown by the Africans. 
Within the co-operative societies, mostly locational - based 
in Kirinyaga, religious or political differences do not exist but at 
the co-operative union level political differences, introduced by the 
local politicians, exist but are not insurmountable. For example, 
all the local politicians exert considerable pressure that the senior 
officials of the union are recruited evenly from the two divisions of 
Ndia and Gichugu where coffee is grown (the third division, Mwea, does 
not grow coffee due to climatic constraints). Recruiting of employees 
is made even worse by pressures resulting from the different clans, each 
seeking to promote its members to high echelons of the primary societies 
and union administrative machinery. Also favours shown in grading of 
cherry are partially based on "danism" and nepotism. This principle, 
however, is of even greater importance in the more racially and tribally 
mixed areas, especially in towns and in the former "White Highlands". 
(f) Continuous Education of Members 
Apart from the practical experience with democracy and leadership, 
courses for both committee and ordinary members are held in CCK and FTCS. 
In Kirinyaga in 1970, 209 committee members and 146 ordinary members of 
coffee co-operatives attended courses in Kianyaga FTC (see Table 2.1). In 
addition to these courses, members of each co-operative coffee processing 
factory hold regular monthly meetings. In these meetings the DCEO and 
other field staff of the Ministry of Agriculture discuss the improvements 
the members could make in their farming practices to increase their yields 
and cherry quality. They are also given reports of the out-turns of the 
recently delivered coffee by the society employees in each factory. 
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The discussion of this chapter has mainly centred on the general 
principles of co-operation and the overall problems of the co-operative 
movement in Kenya. Other than being diminished by misappropriation of funds 
and mismanagement, the members' returns are also substantially diminished 
by the inefficiencies arising from a plethora of small mono-crop societies, 
as the development plan points out (Republic of Kenya, 1966). In the 
specific case being studied, if the co-operative coffee processing factories 
were operating below the optimal size, the operational costs per unit of 
output would be relatively higher and these would considerably reduce the 
members' returns. But, before testing the hypothesis of this study, 
that the members of the co-operative processing units, in spite of the 
existing misappropriation of funds and poor financial control, would stand 
to lose if they broke off from the co-operative processing factories to 
start their individual or only a few individual processing factories 
operating substantially below the "optimal level", the theory of economies 
of scale and the sources of economies of scale in the co-operative sector 
coffee industry will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN CO-OPERATIVE COFFEE 
PROCESSING AND MARKETING 
1. Economies of Scale - General 
So far, a more theoretical treatment of the principle of 
economies of scale, with respect to cost curves, has been presented in 
Chapter 1. This chapter, however, will be mainly concerned with the 
discussion of the principle in relation to the maximising of the returns 
of the members of the co-operative coffee processing factories o r , as 
a corollary, the reduction of costs. This is also the central issue of 
this study. 
Economies of scale could be defined as the "...potential 
reductions in average unit costs which are associated with higher levels 
of productive capacity, with capacity measured in terms of the number of 
units of the standard product which can be produced per unit of time" 
(Patten, et a l , 1965). The economies of large-scale production, called 
for short "economies of scale", may be either "internal" or "external" 
(Cairncross, 1960). Internal economies, Cairncross continues, are 
those which are open to a single factory or a single firm independently 
of the action of other firms. They result from an increase of the scale 
of output of the firm, and cannot be achieved unless output is increased. 
They are not the result of invention of any kind, but are due to the use 
of known methods of production which a small farm does not find worthwhile, 
For instance, although a small-scale arabica coffee farmer may know that 
through wet processing he could obtain clean coffee of higher quality, 
construction of a processing plant (which requires to be supplied by 
about 80 hectares to operate optimally) is not by any means worthwhile to 
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him, especially when he ovms less than half a hectare of coffee. He, 
therefore, uses inferior methods of processing and earns less from his 
coffee, as a result. External economies, on the other hand, are those 
which are shared by a number of firms or industries when the scale of 
production in any industry or group of industries increases (ibid). 
Cairncross points out that external economies, unlike internal economies, 
are not monopolised by a single firm when it grows in size, but are 
conferred on it when some other firms grow larger. It is, therefore, 
apparent that whenever an increase in the output of one firm has a 
favourable reaction on the efficiency of the other firm, either in the 
same industry or in other industries, these firms enjoy the benefit of 
external economies. 
Although the central issue of this study is that of internal 
economies of scale, it should be mentioned that the co-operative coffee 
factories benefit from external economies as well. Coffee factories 
in the same administrative zone (specifically a location) have combined 
to form a co-operative society which makes the marketing arrangements, 
especially transport, on behalf of its constituent factories. An increase 
in output of the various factories in the same co-operative society may 
make more efficient the use of a society lorry and this, in turn, makes 
more efficient the operation of another factory which may not even have 
experienced an increase in its own output. This is clearly a benefit of 
external economies of scale as far as the co-operative factories are 
concerned, although it is a benefit of internal economies as far as the 
societies are concerned. 
But co-operative societies in the same district have also 
combined to form a District Co-operative Union (DCU) which performs some 
duties on behalf of the co-operative societies. The DCU makes bulky orders 
of inputs and also controls the accounting system of the societies. If 
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some of the societies in the DCU increase their output, this increases 
the output of the KDCU and may, most likely, make more efficient the 
KDCU and in turn the constituent co-operative societies benefit from 
this efficiency. This is clearly a benefit of external economies of 
scale as far as the societies are concerned but of internal economies 
at the DCU level. It, therefore, seems reasonable to conclude that 
each successive level of co-operation seems to make internal the 
economies of scale that were otherwise external at the previous level. 
The general principle of economies of scale hinges on 
indivisibility or lumpiness of factors in the production process 
(Etherington, 1971). In his paper, Moore (1959) similarly asserts, 
"...it is usual to attribute economies of scale primarily - if not 
solely - to the lack of divisibility of productive units". These 
lumpy factors should be exploited optimally, that is, to full capacity, 
if the potential benefits of economies of scale are going to be realised. 
This is particularly spelt out by Moore (1959) in his article. He says: 
"Economies are realised by moving in the direction of larger coiranon 
denominators of equipment, i.e., where fewer units are operated at less 
than capacity". As an illustration. Figure 3.1 shows a cost-output 
relationship. 
A co-operative factory on any step of Figure 3.1, at any but 
the extreme right hand point of the step, can accommodate increased output 
without increasing the fixed costs and thereby the average fixed costs 
will be decreased as the output is increased. All the co-operative 
factories in Kirinyaga are two-disc factories (with two pulpers - see 
Haarer, 1962,for an explanation of the techniques and machinery used in 
coffee processing), and could be assumed to be on the step BF on 
Figure 3,1. Internal economies could be achieved by increasing the 
output of the coffee factory from B to F so as to utilise the "excess 
capacity created by lumpy investments" (Etherington, 1971). 
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FIGURE 3.1 
COST-OUTPUT RELATIONSHIP 
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Similarly, this proposition could be illustrated in Figure 3.2 
(following Weitzman [1970]) where demand Y(t) and productive capacity 
K(t) are on vertical axis and time (t) on the horizontal axis 
(Etherington, 1971). "The optimal minimum cost, investment policy simply 
means no expansion of capacity until demand has caught up with existing 
capacity. Economies of scale would thus be evident during the time 
periods when excess capacity exists, that is, over each horizontal section 
of broken line in the diagram" (ibid). 
"Internal economies can be grouped together under five headings: 
technical, managerial, commercial (marketing), financial and risk spreading" 
(Cairncross, 1960). Viner (1931), on the other hand, asserts, "Internal 
economies may be either technological or pecuniary, that is, they may 
consist either in reduction of the technological coefficients of production 
or in reductions in the prices paid for the factors as the result of 
increases in the amounts thereof purchased." Walters (1963), although 
dealing with economies of scale in general rather than with internal 
economies of scale, gives the causative factors of the economies of scale 
which could as well be used as a framework in discussing internal 
economies of scale. He points out that "economies of scale arise first 
because of the ease of dealing with large quantities. The second reason 
is alleged to be the spreading of risks and reduction of the costs of 
uncertainty. The third, and probably most generally accepted, reason for 
falling costs is the existence of indivisibilities in both men and capital 
equipment". 
But in spite of the fact that Cairncross (1960) gives a rather 
elementary treatment of economies of scale, his classfication of internal 
economies of scale is more suitable for the purpose of this study and it 
is the one used in the discussion of internal economies of scale in the 
co-operative coffee factories. 
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2. Technical Economies 
Technical economies of scale arise from the fact that "for 
many Items of equipment and machinery, an Increase in capacity and 
output does not require a proportionate Increase in material and labour. 
This arises from two phenomena: (1) indivisibilities of machinery and 
individual workers...; and (2) a family of geometric relationships which 
relate the materials required for the building of equipment to the 
equipment's capacity" (Haldi,et al, 1967). 
As far as indivisibilities are concerned Cairncross (1960) 
points out that "in industries where technical economies of scale are 
great, the size of the typical establishment will tend to be correspondingly 
great, while in industries where size is of little technical advantage, 
and the method of large plants can be duplicated on a small-scale, the 
typical establishment will tend to remain small". 
In the smallholder arablca coffee Industry of Kenya, however, 
it is considered that technical economies of scale are very substantial. 
This is shown explicitly by the colonial government agricultural 
development policy which spearheaded the development of the smallholder 
arablca coffee industry in Kenya. It states, "the policy is to put up 
large numbers of pulping factories at a cost of £1,000 to £1,500 each 
to serve about 200 acres (80 hectares) of coffee, or one per five square 
miles"(Swynnerton, 1954). Hyden (1970) also points out that "in 
particular, co-operative coffee factories were promoted as a technical 
measure to handle more efficiently the small quantities marketed daily 
by African producers". 
It should be noted that in the smallholder coffee Industry 
"most of the farmers have about 0.13 hectares under coffee"(approximately 
150 trees) (Krug, et al, 1968), and as such very many farmers need to get 
together to collectively construct and supply adequately for a coffee 
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factory, if they are going to realise the potential advantage of arabica 
coffee over that of robusta coffee. Kenya specialises in arabica coffee 
which in addition to its need for very good crop husbandry practices, in 
contrast to robusta coffee, necessitates the use of the wet-processing 
method, as opposed to the simpler and cheaper dry-processing method used 
in robusta coffee (see Haarer, 1962, Chapter 12, for details of coffee 
processing and also Rowe, 1963, pp.25-26). 
The wet-processing method (which is the main concern of this 
study) requires the establishment of a processing factory at a cost oE 
£1,000 to £1,500 (Swynnerton, 1954), which is too much for a smallholder 
owning one, if not less, hectare of coffee. This is the main portion of 
the capital referred to by Weitzman (1970) as the "indirectly productive 
infrastructure which lays down the basic framework within which directly 
productive economic activities can function". In each factory technical 
economies would be evident during the time periods when excess capacity 
created by the "indirectly productive infrastructure" exists. This 
excess capacity must, therefore, be fully exploited for the average fixed 
costs to be at the minimum. 
But in addition to utilising the excess capacity, technical 
economies arise from production situations where larger units increase 
their capacity much more than their material costs. For example, in 
cylindrical tanks the volume increases much faster than the area of the 
sides (more specifically by of the area, where r is the radius and 
h is the the height). This is the basic reason why there are large 
"gas works" and oil-tankers, etc. - the capacity/capital cost ratio is 
greater than one. Similarly, large transmission lines can carry 
electricity much more cheaply and chemical plants' cost increases as the 
6/10 power of its output. This is very well put by Haldi, (1967): 
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"The amount of material required for containers (tanks, 
furnaces, kettles, pipes and so on) depends principally 
on the surface area, whereas capacity depends on the 
volume inclosed. Thus for a pipe of a given length, 
for example, circumference will be the chief determinant 
of material requirements, whereas capacity depends on 
the cross-sectional area of the pipe. We can express 
all these geometric relationships by a generalized 
exponential function of the form: 
C = aX^ 
I'/here C represents cost, X output capacity and a is a 
constant, the exponential b may be called the 'scale 
coefficient'. A value of b<l implies increasing returns 
to scale, b=l shows constant returns and b>l implies 
decreasing returns." 
He concludes by saying that "geometrical relationships apply to many 
basic industrial processes". Wet coffee processing, too, in most of 
its stages uses techniques in which volume, capacity and rates of fluid 
flow are important - hence technical economies of scale are important. 
For example, wet processing calls for a plentiful supply of 
clean water (Haarer, 1962). Washing of the cherry, before pulping, in 
the reception tank (see Figure 3.3) requires an ample supply of clean 
water. Pulping, too, requires a lot of clean water and as Haarer (1962) 
points out the flow of pulped coffee from the pulper to the fermenting 
tanks and the pre-washing and the rough grading, done before parchment 
gets to the fermenting tanks, are assisted by water-flow in the 
appropriate channels. The washing of parchment after fermentation and 
also the disposing of the peeled skins are also assisted by a water-flow. 
The conducting channels are constructed in such a way that additional 
water supplies may be turned on by tap at convenient points. The peeled 
skins flow into a graded concrete channel with the help of water, which 
leads to a drainage area where the skins are dumped. 
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FIGURE 3.3 
CONCRETE RECEPTION TANK OF A COFFEE FACTORY 
/ . 
Concrete Reception Tank and Siphon Feed 
A - Water supply; B - Outlet for floating cherry; 
C - Siphon outlet for heavy cherry to pulper; 
D - Gate over trap; E - Trap; F - Outlet for stones and mud; 
G - Gate rod; H - Slope of land. 
Source; Haarer, A.E., (1962), Modern Coffee Production, 
Leonard Hill (Books) Ltd. 
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The water, for example, involves pumping from the river and, 
"as the size of pumps increases, the cost per horse power definitely 
decreases so that although the marginal physical product tends to be 
constant above 200,000 barrels per day (in the case of oil) the capital 
costs per unit may continue to fall if large pumps are used" (Moore, 
1959). Water also involves piping from the pump to the storage tank and 
then to the reception tank, pulper and the appropriate channels. "The 
study of pipelines indicates clearly that economies of scale exist in 
the industry. Marginal physical product increases up to about 200,000 
barrels per day (in the case of oil) and for larger throughputs the 
marginal returns appear to be approximately constant"(ibid). 
Similarly, substantial technical economies exist in the large 
water storage tank, the reception tank, the pulper, the flow and washing 
channels, in fermentation tanks and in the drying and storage facilities, 
because the larger the better since the capacity/capital cost ratio is 
greater than one. As already pointed out, this stems from the fact that, 
"it has been noted by engineers that the cost of an item is frequently 
related to its surface area, while the capacity of the item increases 
in accordance with its volume" (ibid), and surface area changes as the 
2/3 power of volume in storage tanks. 
In a study of processing and manufacturing plants, the data 
obtained supported "the opinion of engineers who feel that unit processing 
and manufacturing costs decline as plants increase in size, up to very 
large plant sizes"(Haldi, et al, 1967). There is no good reason to 
suggest that the same situation does not exist in the arabica coffee 
industry where wet-processing is the rule. This is because as it has 
already been shown there are many structures in coffee processing in 
which geometric-engineering considerations are important in that "the 
cost of an item is frequently related to its surface area while the 
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capacity increases according to its volume"(Weitzman, 1970). 
In such cases, "large machines are usually more efficient than small 
ones" (Walters, 1963). 
Although technical economies are important in the smallholder 
arabica coffee industry, to exploit the technical economies to the 
maximum, the co-operative coffee factories should be operated optimally. 
"The optimal minimum cost, investment policy means no expansion of 
capacity until demand has caught up with the existing capacity" 
(Etherington, 1971). (See points A, B and C on Figure 3.2 where demand 
has caught up with the existing capacity in each case.) In the case 
of the co-operative coffee factories, the optimal minimum cost output 
level of a two disc-factory will be determined in Chapter 4 and also 
the optimal output level with respect to the members' returns, sales 
less costs and sales price (quality of processed coffee) in K.shs. per 
tonne of clean coffee - that is the output levels at which the three would 
be at the maximum - will be shown in Chapter 4. 
3. Managerial Economies 
"Managerial economies may be effected by increasing the size 
of an establishment or by grouping a number of establishments under one 
management" (Cairncross, 1960). In their study of industrial plants, 
Haldi and Whitcomb (1967) concluded that "the data indicate substantial 
economies of scale in supervisory and management costs, about on the 
order of economies of scale for operating labour". They point out that 
the data they could obtain "showed that large economies of scale in 
labour costs are possible for process type plants. Labour's chief 
function in process plants is to watch gauges, adjust valves and perform 
maintenance tasks. Consequently, large increases in capacity often 
require few extra workers" (ibid). The labour cadre they refer to is 
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the skilled labour or the graded staff in the coffee societies of 
Kirinyaga. There is all the likelihood, therefore, that there are 
substantial managerial economies in the organisation of the co-operative 
coffee industry. 
Figure 3.4 represents an organisation or a managerial chart 
of the co-operative coffee sector, primary level, in Kirinyaga district. 
All the staff shown in the three stages of organisation, except the 
manual labourers, are the "management staff" and are paid by the KDCU 
as opposed to the manual labourers who are paid by the individual factories. 
The management staff are "salaried" as opposed to the manual labourers 
who, in most cases, are paid wages on a casual basis. 
Large increases in output of the various factories, and, in 
turn, of the societies and the DCU, would require very few extra management 
staff, if any, and this, therefore, reduces the average salary costs per 
unit of output, and this is clearly a result of managerial economies. 
If managerial economies of scale are significant then there should be 
differences in managerial efficiency such that larger co-operative 
societies are more efficient. If this is the case, this society efficiency 
would be transferred, as external economies, to the various factories 
that are in a particular society. In Chapter 4, it will be tested whether 
this society efficiency or the society effect on the co-operative coffee 
factories is significantly great, thus forcing co-operative coffee 
factories belonging to one society to be on a different plane of efficiency 
from factories belonging to another society. This, if found to be 
significantly great, could be attributed to different efficiency levels 
resulting from managerial and other economies in the different co-operative 
societies. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
ORGANIZATIONAL OR MANAGERIAL CHART OF THE 
CO-OPERATIVE COFFEE INDUSTRY IN KIRINYAGA DISTRICT 
Union General Manager 
Union 
Chief 
Account-
ant 
Union 
Secre-
tary 
Society 
SSM 
Edu- Factory Supplies 
cational Super- Officer 
Secretary visor 
SSM SSM 
Society 
Secretary 
Manager 
SS SSM SS^ 
Factory 
Orders 
Clerk 
Book 
Keeper 
FM FM FM 
Local 
Factory 
Super-
visor 
Society 
Factory 
"Engineer" 
FM FM 
Factory Manager 
Assistant Factory Manager 
Cherry 
Inspector 
Weighing 
and Records 
Clerk 
Processing 
Inspector 
Manual labourers 
Orders 
Clerk 
48 
Cairncross (1960), points out that "both methods of expansion 
(that is increasing the size of an establishment or grouping a number of 
establishments under one management) create opportunities for increased 
specialisation", and that these opportunities are not confined to the 
"managing staff but to the entire labour force". This is because 
workers can be kept employed on a narrow range of tasks, he suggests. 
This specialisation is twofold, delegation of detail and functional 
specialisation and each will be looked at as it applies to the coffee 
industry of Kirinyaga district. 
(a) Delegation of Detail; 
An owner of a small business "may enjoy being worker, 
foreman, and manager combined, and have no wish to change. But if he is 
an able organiser, he will produce at lower costs - and incidentally 
make a larger profit - by expanding his business and delegating routine 
and details to subordinates. This will leave him free time to concentrate 
on the more difficult work of organisation. But all this will only be 
possible in a large business, where his time is not taken up with what 
a lower paid worker could do equally well, and where his powers of 
foresight, initiative and judgment are spread over the maximum volume of 
output to which they will stretch"(ibid). 
For example, in Kiburi factory, a private factory, the factory 
manager supervises all the manual labourers and keeps records and does 
all the management duties in the factory and does not even have an assistant, 
This factory handles an average of 10.726 tonnes of clean coffee per 
season, and as such he is a bit too thinly spread over the whole business. 
He is thus unlikely to process as high quality clean coffee as a 
co-operative factory manager who has delegated routine and details to 
subordinates (see Figure 3.4). The situation would have been even worse 
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were Kiburi processing as much coffee as some of the co-operative coffee 
factories. In 1969-70, the quality of clean coffee processed by Kiburi 
factory was below the district average in the co-operative sector (compare 
K.shs. 6310.00 obtained by Kiburi to K.shs. 7451.43 which was the 
co-operative societies' district average, per tonne of clean coffee). 
One would, therefore, contend that Kiburi would have perhaps produced 
better clean coffee with slightly more delegation. The need for 
delegation may become even more crucial at higher levels of co-operative 
sector coffee organisation, that is, the society and DCU levels. 
(b) Functional Specialisation; 
Taking the factory level of organisation (see Figure 3.4), 
by delegation of detail, the factory manager appoints various persons to 
supervise various duties and this culminates in administrative functional 
sections with their respective heads, and himself as the overall 
co-ordinator. Each head of the section, a "specialist" in his field, 
through further specialisation in his field, performs well. For example, 
the one in charge of processing appoints someone (usually one of the 
permanent labourers) to stay at the pulper, some others to do the pre-
washing and the rough grading and lead the washed coffee into the 
fermentation tanks; others for washing after fermentation and turning 
coffee in fermentation tanks and still others for draining and drying 
the parchment. Each of these groups specialises in their work and becomes 
relatively efficient. This improves the productivity of the workers and 
hence removes the need for many workers and so reduces the costs of 
processing. 
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4. Marketing Economies 
"Economies in the purchase of materials and sale of goods may 
be just as important as economies in manufacture" (Cairncross, 1960). 
To illustrate this statement, Cairncross (1960) gives an English example 
in pre-war years where it was found out that smallholders were paying 
10 per cent more for feeding-stuffs and 20 per cent more for their 
fertilisers than "large-scale"(300-500 acres) farmers. In this section, 
economies of marketing arising from the sale of coffee and purchase of 
inputs for both the factory and members' use will be discussed. 
In Kenya, each grower, in the case of large scale owners and 
each co-operative coffee factory, in the case of smallholder coffee, sends 
the clean coffee, dried parchment, to the KPCU mills for hulling, roasting, 
tasting, grading and auctioning. Each consignment from each large grower 
or co-operative factory is treated and graded separately. But it has 
already been pointed out that the co-operative sector coffee is produced 
by about 300,000 farmers and involves slightly over 50,000 hectares of 
Kenya's over 82,000 hectares. This means that each smallholder has an 
average of .16 hectares. It would have been very expensive to hull such 
small amounts of coffee separately and as it has already been mentioned it 
has been made easier by grouping together the smallholders into groups of 
200-300 or more to make 80 hectares, more or less, which is considered 
adequate to supply a two-disc factory (with two pulpers). 
Each factory in Kirinyaga delivers clean coffee to the KPCU 
mills about eight times per season - usually called "out-turns" - in order 
to keep the earnings of the members well distributed. For each delivery, 
the following charges are made by the KPCU mills: 
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(i) Out-turn fees - K.shs. 100 per out-turn; 
(ii) KPCU mill charges - K.shs.5.50 per 50 kgs of parchment; and 
(iii) Agent's commission - %per cent of total sales of clean coffee, 
in addition to the transport costs from the factories to Sagana. 
Appendix 7 shows the distances between the society headquarters and 
Sagana where the Kenya Coffee Marketing Board stores are situated. 
Among the above-mentioned costs, the out-turn fee is the only 
fixed cost. Although it is relatively small once members group together 
to form a co-operative factory, delivering about 10 tonnes of clean coffee 
and above per season, it would be quite substantial for an average Kenya 
grower owning an average of .16 hectares of coffee, because for a moderate 
crop of 1.250 tonnes per hectare, he would deliver about .200 tonnes of 
clean coffee. The co-operative factories in the same location have also 
combined to form a co-operative society. Each society owns a lorry which 
transports coffee belonging to each of the constituent factories to 
Sagana and collects the ordered inputs from the KDCU headquarters for 
distribution to each factory. Although this may slightly reduce transport 
and distribution costs, such a reduction may not be enough to justify 
joining a co-operative factory because a private member could use private 
transport where he could be charged, say, per bag basis. There does not, 
therefore, seem to be substantial marketing economies of scale. 
It has already been mentioned that large scale farmers in 
England were found to pay for their inputs at a substantially lower rate 
than the smallholders. This is because "the large firm enjoys preferential 
treatment, partly because of economies of large orders"(ibid). This would 
be the same for the coffee co-operative factories when compared to 
individual small growers. A small grower would purchase his inputs -
very substantial for coffee, including fertilisers and spraying chemicals -
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from a local retail shop. By the time such inputs get to the hands of an 
individual grower, quite a large number of middle-men have claimed their 
respective market margins, and the prices get fairly high. Again, an 
individual farmer may not be able to pay for his inputs in cash terms 
as required by the local merchant and as a consequence he cannot obtain 
the chemicals and fertilisers when he wants them. 
A member of a co-operative factory, however, is in a much better 
position not only because he can obtain his inputs on credit, but also 
because of the economies of large-scale orders and perhaps savings on 
transport and distribution at cost, he can buy them cheaply. Table 3.1 
gives a comparison of retail shop prices for nitrogenous fertilisers 
and chemicals and the society prices, uniform in the district, for 
mid-1972. 
TABLE 3.1 
RETAIL SHOPS AND SOCIETY PRICES OF FERTILISERS AND CHEMICALS 
MID-1972 
Fertiliser or Chemical 
Retail Shop 
Price 
K.shs. 
Society Price 
K.shs. 
Saving 
per cent 
CAN or ASN (26%) - 50 kgs 35. 00 29.05 20 
Copper (50%) - 25 kgs 250. 00 235.25 6 
Captafol (80%) - 25 kgs 660. 60 643.75 3 
Dieldrin (18%) - litre n. a 1. 13.40 -
Fenitrothion (50%) - 20 litres 359. 00 290.00 24 
Fenithion (50%) - 20 litres 495. 00 490.00 1 
Source: DCEO Technical File and KDCU Files. 
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Unfortunately the potential scale economies in purchasing and 
distribution are not fully exploited. The savings in transport and 
distribution costs of inputs could have been even higher had the KDCU 
constructed a store at Sagana to store all the inputs instead of the 
KDCU lorries taking the inputs from Sagana to the KDCU headquarters, 
28 kilometres away, from where all the distribution to the societies is 
made. The orders of each factory should be made in such a way that they 
coincide with the coffee delivery to Sagana so that the lorries take them 
to the respective factories on the return journey. This would create no 
inconvenience because most of the inputs are not perishable and could be 
stored as safely in the factory stores as in the KDCU or society stores, 
until the members are ready to collect them. This would be far cheaper 
than the present system whereby the inputs are collected from the railway 
station at Sagana, taken to the KDCU headquarters, and then from there 
the inputs are collected by the society lorries and taken to the factories 
and even sometimes to the society headquarters, from where the inputs have 
still to be distributed to the co-operative factories - a really 
cumbersome and expensive process. 
All the same, some of the economies of large scale orders have 
accrued to the farmers as far as inputs are concerned (see Table 3.1), 
and perhaps to the co-operative factories and eventually to the members, 
through marketing and purchase of processing materials. This would not 
have been possible with individual growers and such economies are likely 
to be more substantial for larger co-operative factories than the smaller 
ones, if the hypothesis of this thesis is confirmed. 
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5. Financial Economies 
In addition to the various economies, already discussed, the 
larger firm has many financial advantages. "It can borrow from 
bankers upon the better security and raise capital more easily" (ibid). 
This makes the cost of obtaining credit or of raising fresh capital 
lower than of a small firm. This is because the lending of money in 
large quantities is less costly than the lending of money in small 
quantities - the red tape for a small loan Is no different from that of 
a larger loan. In addition, the ease with which a co-operative factory, 
for example, can recover its capital is in itself an economy of scale. 
In Kenya, it was initially planned that K£420,000 would be 
lent to the co-operatives by the Government to construct about 350 
coffee factories, and this capital was to be recovered from members' 
proceeds, besides all the extra running costs (Swynnerton, 1954). 
The costs of collecting repayments, on the side of the Government, were 
very low because all the Government had to do was to claim for the 
repayment from the societies which, in turn, would deduct it from the 
members' proceeds. It would have meant a lot of paperwork, and even 
individual contacts, had the Government given these funds to individual 
growers. The development plan (1970-74) shows clearly the difficulties 
being encountered by institutions administering credit to the small-scale 
farmers and shows how efficiently co-operative movements could be exploited 
to make a credit system for small-scale farmers successful and cheap to 
administer. 
"The AFC (Agricultural Financial Corporation) has experienced 
serious problems in trying to administer short-term credit for 
small-scale farmers, in part because of the high administrative 
costs and high risks involved. While the commercial banks have 
issued some short-term credit to small-scale farmers, it is 
unlikely that they will be able to substantially expand 
operations in this field, again because of the high administrative 
costs of Issuing small loans for short periods. However, if 
there were a well-organised system of co-operative marketing 
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most of the administrative structure necessary for a 
short-term agricultural credit would exist. The farmers 
would have accounts through which credit could be issued 
and repayments collected automatically when farm produce 
was sold, and the Co-operative Bank could issue relatively 
larger loans to the societies rather than to the individual 
members and thus keep administrative costs to a reasonable 
level." (Republic of Kenya, 1969). 
This realisation of substantial financial economies existing 
in the co-operatives has led the Government to set up the Co-operative 
Bank of Kenya (CBK), on 1st January, 1968 (ibid), which gives short-term 
credit, Lindquist Production Credit Scheme (LPCS) or Co-operative 
Production Credit Scheme (CPCS), to the smallholders through their 
co-operatives and an allocation of Kfi425,000 of development funds had 
been set aside for this purpose over the plan period - 1970-74. 
"However, before this can be considered, the co-operatives will 
be required to demonstrate that they can use their funds 
effectively, [and] in the first few years [up to now] of this 
scheme, small-scale farmers in Kenya will be able to obtain 
short-term credit from co-operative societies, only if they 
are members of the 120 societies which are sufficiently 
well-run to qualify for the Co-operative Bank loans." (ibid). 
All the coffee societies of Kirinyaga, running 44 factories, 
are included in the program and the amounts issued to the members of 
the seven societies since the inception of the program in 1970 are 
shown in Table 3.2, below: 
TABLE 3.2 
CPCS LOANS IN KIRINYAGA DISTRICT 
Crop Year Amount in K.Shs. 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
475,528.60 
646,689.20 
2,000,000.00 
(proposed) 
Source: KDCU files 
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Since the inception, the amount issued has increased 
considerably and as a result the IDA (International Development Agency) 
Small-scale Scheme, started earlier through the AFC, has been losing its 
initial momentum, as shovm in Table 3.3, below 
TABLE 3.3 
IDA SMALL-SCALE SCHEME IN KIRINYAGA DISTRICT 
Year Amount in K.shs. 
1968 320,000.00 
1969 638,600.00 
1970 507,565.00 
1971 426,125.00 
1972 360,120.00 
Source; District Agricultural Officer 
Annual Reports. 
The IDA loans are now of importance mainly in the non-coffee areas in the 
district which have no other source of credit. The CPCS loans are more 
preferred to the IDA because the latter is very cumbersome on the part 
of the applicant due to considerably more paper-work, the need to hand 
over one's title deed as security and the fact that the IDA loan is 
only paid after actual expenditure is made. The applicant of an IDA 
loan stands a chance of losing his farm, in case he does not repay his 
loan, which does not happen in CPCS loans where the member's crop is the 
sole security to the society, whereas the society pledges its collective 
assets to the Co-operative Bank as its security. To deduct the repayment 
from the members' proceeds, the co-operatives need not establish a loans 
section because this is deducted along with the deductions of inputs 
incurred by each member and the society sends a block cheque covering the 
repayments of all her members to the Co-operative Bank through the KDCU. 
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This is, therefore, a form of credit which is fairly cheap to 
administer and it is hoped that as more and more co-operatives improve 
their management efficiency, the scheme will be extended to most of the 
societies because this will mean that a high proportion of small-scale 
farmers will be able to obtain short-term credit from co-operative 
societies. This will make it possible to exploit the financial 
economies existent in the co-operative enterprise that would not have 
existed in the case of an individual small-scale grower. 
6. Risk Bearing Economies 
Large firms are often less exposed to risk than smaller ones 
because they can eliminate risks by grouping them (Cairncross, 1960). 
A large firm also tends to be more stable than a smaller one because it 
is less likely to be overwhelmed financially, by a purely local 
catastrophe (ibid). 
But a co-operative business is owned by the individual members, 
in the case of this study, the coffee growers, and it is most important 
to find out whether the individual members have lessened their risks by 
joining a co-operative factory than if they were out of one. By joining 
a co-operative factory a farmer forgoes the control of processing his 
crop and also his coffee is pooled with coffee from many other farms -
to his advantage or disadvantage. On the other side of the balance sheet 
he receives protection from his co-operative factory in that even if his 
coffee were hit by a serious disease and never yielded in the current 
season, he would get inputs on credit to revive his coffee. He also 
gets the services of "qualified" staff at considerably lower costs than 
he would have had as an individual, use of technology that he could not 
have afforded as an individual, and well-distributed incomes because the 
co-operative factory can deliver about eight out-turns per season whereas 
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an individual member would only manage to deliver one in a season 
due to his small quantities. It would seem then that the members 
stand to gain by belonging to a co-operative factory and hence their 
risks may be reduced. 
In concluding this chapter, it should be noted that these 
economies of large-scale production have been regarded as illustrations 
of three general principles: 
(i) The principle of indivisibilities, 
(ii) The principle of bulk transactions, and 
(iii) The principle of massed or pooled resources (Cairncross, 
1960). 
The principle of indivisibilities, sometimes called the principle of 
multiples, refers to the technical economies and also "underlies the 
emplojrment of specialists and the full utilization of managerial 
ability" (ibid). It rests on the "impossibility of reproducing a 
machine on a small scale" (ibid). The principle of bulk transactions, 
on the other hand, underlies most of the marketing and financial 
economies, already discussed, while the principle of massed or pooled 
resources is the basis of the risk-bearing economies (ibid). 
It is, therefore, apparent that the bigger the output, the 
greater the efficiency with which clean coffee is produced and marketed 
by a co-operative coffee factory. It is, however, a reasonable question 
to ask whether costs always fall with size or whether there may not be 
some counterveiling tendency for size to become a handicap (ibid). 
Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1, shows that the average total cost curve falls 
with size up to a point, labelled "optimum output", and then starts 
to rise. It is, therefore, apparent that after some stage, size becomes 
a handicap and this is reflected by the rising part of the average total 
cost curve in Figure 1.2, labelled "diseconomies of scale". 
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In Chapter 4, an investigation will be attempted to determine whether 
this is the case in the co-operative processing factories in Kirinyaga 
district. 
If this is confirmed, it could be explained by the fact that 
once a firm's output exceeds a certain volume it starts to encounter 
increasing difficulties in co-ordinating its activities and managerial 
diseconomies creep in. These diseconomies are sufficient to offset 
any remaining technical or other economies of scale so that eventually 
higher output involves it in higher unit costs (ibid). There is, 
therefore, an optimum scale of production at which costs are at a 
minimum, and firms producing on a scale smaller than the optimum would 
be incurring higher costs "by sacrificing the use of expensive 
machinery without any compensating advantage", whereas firms larger 
than the optimum would also incur higher costs because the organisation 
is cumbersome and beyond the powers of the management (ibid). Discussion 
in Chapter 4 will lead to the examination of the optimal output levels in 
co-operative coffee factories in Kirinyaga. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND ITS STATISTICAL VERIFICATION 
The hypothesis of this study is that in spite of the 
acknowledged inefficiencies arising from the co-operative organisation 
of the smallholder coffee industry in Kirinyaga district, the members 
of a co-operative coffee fectory stand to gain more by belonging to a 
larger co-operative factory that operates near to capacity through their 
co-operative action in supplying such a factory adequately, than 
operating smaller individual coffee processing facilities in which they 
have direct control but which operates far below the optimal scale level. 
To state it more explicitly, this study hypothesises that the members' 
unit returns increase with the increasing output of a coffee factory 
processing their coffee and hence the optimal output level of a two-disc 
coffee factory is far beyond what an individual or even a few smallholders 
could supply. The co-operative coffee factory members, therefore, would 
in general be ill-advised to press for the further fragmentation of the 
existing processing system. 
This is clearly a study concerning the principle of economies 
of scale in a co-operative enterprise, the smallholder coffee industry of 
Kirinyaga district. So far, the background information underlying the 
principle of economies of scale has been presented in Chapters 1 and 3, 
while the principles of co-operation have been outlined in Chapter 2. 
The aim of this chapter is to test the hypothesis but before this can be 
done effectively, an explanation of the economic model to be used in the 
analysis will be undertaken. 
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1. The Economic Model 
In economic analysis, use of an invalid model invalidates the 
results of the analysis. It is, therefore, very important to justify 
the model that is going to be used in this study. 
This study assumes that the co-operative factories are perfect 
competitors because each of them is a very small producer in the context 
of the Kenya coffee industry, let alone the world coffee market. 
For instance, in 1969-70 the biggest co-operative factory in Kirinyaga 
district processed only 66.076 tonnes of clean coffee as compared to the 
estimated 1969-70 Kenya coffee crop of 35,980 tonnes (Kenya Coffee, 
February, 1970), whereas the smallest coffee factory processed as little 
as 10 tonnes. It should, however, be noted that the competition in 
coffee factories is characterised by a degree of product differentiation 
in that the coffee processed by each factory is graded separately, and 
hence its price depends not only on the ruling world market price but 
also on the grading. But, all the same, the factories equally possess 
the perfect knowledge of the requirements of the market as far as quality 
is concerned, and it is left to each factory to meet the requirements of 
the market. Thus quality in itself is an aspect of competition among 
the factories. But although perfectly competitive firms, supposedly, are 
to produce a homogeneous product, it should be noted that "no market 
has been or can be perfectly competitive"(Ferguson, 1972). Therefore, 
in spite of product differentiation, arising from the grading of clean 
coffee, and each grade commanding a higher price than the lower one, the 
coffee factories will be regarded as perfect competitors in this study. 
The study also assumes that the coffee factories are all operating 
on the same technological production function, and as such they will have 
the same cost curve because the average cost curve is assumed to be derived 
from an identical production function. The basic production function is 
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the same because as already seen in the previous chapter the design and 
capacity of the equipment is similar for all factories. Also, the 
equipment was built at about the same time, and hence the technology is 
the same in all the factories. In addition, all the factories are faced 
with the same input prices because a bulk order is made by the KDCU for 
and on behalf of all the societies. The KDCU then standardises all 
input prices to the co-operative factories but the KDCU, too, is a small 
buyer in the context of the Kenya input market. The per man labour 
wages, too, facing all the factories in the district are about the same 
and all the senior staff are paid by the KDCU. 
Following the above argument, and given that the factories 
face the same input prices, have the same technology and face the same 
output prices for a similar grade of coffee, the scatter of observations 
of costs, profit, members' returns and price per tonne of clean coffee, 
should be fairly narrow if indeed the factories are operating on the 
same cost curve and production function. But this is not the case when 
* 
one examines the scatter diagrams in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
* 
In all scatter diagrams, unless otherwise stated, the label of 
each observation could be interpreted as follows: The digit 
represents the society and goes from one to six, and the code 
is given alongside each diagram. 
FIGURE 4.1 
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MEMBERS' RETURNS AND SIZE 
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FIGURE 4.4 
UNIT PRICE AND SIZE 
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There is a fairly wide scatter in all cases and this suggests the 
interference of other variables, other than size. Random effects 
are certainly expected. But, more important, in these co-operatives, 
as with other forms of economic organisation, there could be a 
difference in skill or efficiency in using the identical inputs and 
technology. This is mainly a problem of management and it was 
omitted from the scatter diagrams. 
As firms get larger and more complex, management becomes a 
crucial prerequisite of their efficient functioning. This is suggested 
by Kilby (1962) when he asserts that "the size and complexity of medium 
and large enterprises require a much higher threshold of organisation 
and control". Even in technologically similar firms, as the co-
operative coffee factories of Kirinyaga district, the productivity of 
the factories is different due to management differences. This is true 
not only for co-operative coffee factories but for industrial firms 
also. For instnace, L. Rostas in a study of British and American 
industries found out that "in a number of industries (or firms) where 
the equipment is very largely identical in the US and UK, eggs, boots 
and shoes, tobacco, strip steel (or in firms producing both in the UK 
and US...), there are still substantial differences in output per 
worker in the UK and the US" (Leibenstein, 1966). Leibenstein 
concludes that "clearly, there is more to the determination of output 
than the obviously observable inputs. The nature of management, 
the environment in which it operates, and the incentives employed are 
significant" (ibid). 
The difference in productivity as a result of different 
management could be substantial as Harbison reports after visiting two 
petroleum refineries in Egypt less than one-half mile apart: 
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"The labour productivity of one had been nearly double 
that in the other for many years. But recently under 
completely new management, the inefficient refinery 
was beginning to make quite spectacular improvements 
in efficiency with the same labour force" (quoted by 
Leibenstein op. cit.). 
Management (which is the most important constituent of 
Leibenstein's X-efficiency) is, therefore, very important in medium and 
large firms, and there is no good reason why this does not apply to 
co-operative coffee factories of Kirinyaga because although some types 
of complex machinery may have fixed specifications, "their performance 
may be variable depending on the exact nature of their employment" 
(ibid). 
On examination of the scatter diagrams in Figures A.l, 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4, the coffee factories in the same co-operative society 
seem to be on a different plane of efficiency from factories belonging 
to another society. This seems to suggest a very pronounced difference 
between the society management while at the same time seems to confirm 
differences in factories of the same society on the aspect of size. 
This may seem to suggest that management is society specific rather 
than factory specific. 
Other than size differences, factories of the same society 
are not likely to differ significantly because all the most important 
decisions are made at the society level and the factory managers merely 
implement decisions of the Society Secretary Managers. Any differences 
resulting from differing precision of implementation of management 
decisions by the factory managers are likely to be insignificant. The 
climatic differences among the factories of the same society are not all 
* 
that substantial because the factories are in the same "location" . 
* Administratively, Kenya is divided, in decreasing order of size, 
into Provinces, Districts, Divisions, Locations and Sublocations 
(see Maps 1 and 2). 
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This, therefore, suggests that the differences among the factories of the 
same society are unlikely to be significant. 
The societies, therefore, are likely to differ substantially 
because, firstly, management seems to be society specific, and, as it has 
already been pointed out, management affects both technical and economic 
efficiency of the factories, especially quality control. The ability of 
the various Society Secretary Managers to run the societies cannot be 
expected to be the same and this affects, either adversely or favourably, 
both the society and the constituent factories. 
Secondly, the societies themselves are of different sizes, as 
far as their output and turnover are concerned (see Appendix 9 on Output 
of Societies), and as such various scale economies, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, accrue unequally on the societies. Such economies would 
benefit the constituent factories as external economies but benefit the 
societies as internal economies, as already discussed in Chapter 3. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that the societies are regionally 
located, by location. The climatic differences between societies are 
very minor due to the fact that all the locations are demarcated 
along ridges emanating from Mountain Kenya (see Map 2), rather than 
across ridges. Thus all the locations cover the same climatic zones. 
However, the administrative and the Ministry of Agriculture officials 
in each location are likely to differ in their ability to mobilise people 
and supervise the precision with which the technical processes are 
undertaken. These administrative differences would tend to influence 
coffee processing in a society specific rather than factory specific 
manner. 
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The above three factors are, therefore, likely to cause the 
scatter of the observations of costs, profit, members' returns and price 
per tonne of clean coffee to be wider than the perfectly competitive model 
would suggest. In the analysis, it will be tested whether the effect 
of the societies differences on the factories is significant or not. Our 
statistical model must be appropriately designed to account for the 
society specific (X-efficiency) differences. 
2. Statistical Verification 
This study covers six out of the seven co-operative societies 
in Kirinyaga district and hence the "sample" contains 85.7 per cent of 
the total population. Factory-wise, the study covers 36 out of the 44 
co-operative coffee factories in the district, that is, 81.8 per cent of 
the total co-operative factory population. The "sample", therefore, 
contains most of the observations and hence it will be assumed that 
the study is dealing with a population rather than with a sample. It 
should, therefore, be noted that the main concern of the statistical 
verification of the economic model is with the goodness of fit and not 
with the confidence intervals. Also, the various estimates made in 
this study are the estimates of the true population parameters rather 
than the sample parameters. 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the general trend of observations 
on the scatter diagrams in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, while 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the proposed society specific differences 
included onto the general trends of Figures 4.5 and 4.6. Generally, 
these are cubic functions whose general forms are shown on Figures 4.5 
and 4.6. 
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FIGURE 4.5 
THE GENERAL TREND OF THE SCATTER DIAGRAM IN FIGURE 4.1 
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FIGURE 4.6 
THE GENERAL TREND OF THE SCATTER DIAGRAMS 
IN FIGURES 4.2, 4.3 AND 4.4 
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FIGURE 4.7 
MODIFICATION OF FIGURE 4.5 BY INCORPORATING 
THE SOCIETY EFFICIENCY FACTOR 
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FIGURE 4.8 
MODIFICATION OF FIGURE 4.6 BY INCORPORATING 
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Using the Ordinary Least Squares program of the Univac 1108, 
size and size squared of the co-operative coffee factories, measured 
in tonnes of clean coffee (1 tonne = 1000 kilograms) processed in 
1969-70 crop year, were regressed on costs, members' returns, sales 
less costs (profit) and unit price, per tonne of clean coffee 
respectively. The equations that were obtained are shown on Appendix 11 
and their corresponding curves are shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. The 
t-statistic values shown for the various coefficients show that they 
are significant at 5 per cent level because there is less than .05 
probability that the null hypothesis, that size has no effect on either 
costs, members' returns, profit or unit price, holds true. 
The use of a quadratic function is now justified but a more searching 
investigation should be undertaken to see whether there is anything 
else that would invalidate the use of the model in the analysis of 
this study, let alone the very low coefficient of determination (R^), 
showing the very large "unexplained" variation. 
At the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that 
there are some differences that are society specific and these affect 
the performance of the factories unequally. It should also be noted 
that in the general equations on Figures 4.5 and 4.6 there is the 
additional random variable, ei, which describes the deviation of Yi 
from its expected value. This is usually referred to as the error or 
disturbance term. The £L are independent random variables, with mean = 0 
and variance = a ^ The source of these errors usually arises from 
the measurement of Y and influence on Y of many omitted variables, each 
with an individually small effect, referred to as stochastic errors. 
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FIGURE A. 9 
UNIT COSTS AND OUTPUT OF FACTORIES 
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FIGURE 4.10 
UNIT MEMBERS' RETURNS, PROFIT, PRICE 
AND OUTPUT OF FACTORIES 
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In regression analysis, it is usually assumed that the 
stochastic error term or the regression disturbance e i is an independent 
random variable. It acts as a "catch all" variable and includes all 
effects other than X i which are explicitly included in the regression 
function. 
A simple example illustrates the point. In equation (4.1) where 
Yi = yield and X = fertiliser used, 
Yi = A + BX + ei (4.1) 
ei represents the effects of the variables other than X (fertiliser) 
which would include rain, sunshine, etc., (ibid). In our specific case, 
ei represents the effects of the variables, other than size, which 
would include the society effect, other outlined differences including 
"pure random shocks in the production process"(Aigner, et al, 1968). 
The very low coefficient of determination (R^) shown in Appendix 11, 
shows that the "unexplained" variation is considerable. 
But in business and economic data there is a possibility that 
e i may not be independent, and where the e i are not independent, this 
will usually show up in the form of serial correlation (Yamane, 1970). 
There is no good reason why this study should assume that ei, in this 
case, are independent because if such an assumption is wrong, our results 
will be invalidated. 
If ei show serial correlation or autocorrelation (Theil, 1971), 
the method of least squares may not give the best estimates, that is, 
estimates with minimum variance, and as a result the sampling variances 
of the regression coefficient that is found may seriously underestimate 
the true variance. In addition, it invalidates the use of the t- and 
F-distribution to test the hypothesis or construct the confidence intervals 
(Yamane, 1970). 
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It is, therefore, clear that one has to be sure that the 
assumption of independence in ei is satisfied, and to make sure it is, 
the data in this study will be checked using the Durbin-Watson 
statistic (d) calculated by Professors Durbin and Watson. This tests 
whether £i has serial correlation or not. The details of this test are 
given by Yamane (1970), and also by Theil (1971). In this study the 
Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated by the computer and the Durbin-
Watson critical values, d^ and d^, are given in tables contained in 
the above two references for 5, 2.5 and 1 per cent levels of significance. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no positive serial 
correlation while the alternative hypothesis is that there is positive 
serial correlation. When d is less than d^, then d is significant and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted, that there is serial correlation. 
When d is greater than d^, then d is not significant and the null 
hypothesis is accepted, that there is no serial correlation. But when 
d is less than d^ but more than d^ the test is inconclusive. 0.05 
significant level is used in this study, and the test is illustrated on 
Table 4.1 below. 
It is, therefore, clear that positive correlation is present 
in all but one of the equations, and as such, as it has already been 
pointed out, this invalidates the use of t- and F-distribution to test 
the hypothesis, and an alternative has, therefore, to be found. 
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TABLE 4.1 
DURBIN-WATSON TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION: 
33 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
Dependent Variable d 
5 per cent level 
of significance 
Is there 
Positive 
Serial 
Correlation? dv 
Unit Costs 1.610270 1.35 1.59 No 
Unit Members' Returns 1.328169 II II Yes 
Unit Sales less Costs 1.038412 II II Yes 
Unit Sales 1.320177 II II Yes 
In the scatter diagrams of Figures 4.1 to 4.4, it was pointed 
out that coffee factories of the same society seemed to be on a 
different plane of efficiency from factories belonging to a different 
society. This then indicates that there is a society effect which 
seems to substantially affect the performance of the factories belonging 
to it differently from the way the other societies affect their 
respective factories. This then introduces a "society efficiency" 
factor which is different between the societies and which affects the 
performance of respective factories constituting each of the societies. 
But why are the societies operating at different levels of efficiency? 
Like any other economic organisations, there is no good reason 
to assume that the six co-operative societies could be operating at a 
uniform level of efficiency. The societies are under different 
management, they are of different sizes, and their output ranges between 
99.75 tonnes of clean coffee processed by Mwerua society and 513.87 tonnes 
of clean coffee processed by Ngariama in 1969-70 crop year. In the same 
year their turnover ranged between K.shs.618093 for Kibirigwi society 
and K.shs.4,099,921 for Ngariama society. It has already been shown 
that there are scale economies in the coffee factories and there is reason 
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to believe that fscale economies, too, accrue on the co-operative societies, 
especially when their sizes range so widely. The layout of factories 
in each society is different and so is the area covered by each society. 
The geographical positioning of each society headquarters and their 
respective factories, with respect to the railhead, is also different. 
All these factors may need to be explained by another variable other than 
left in ei and could be called the "society efficiency" factor. 
This is included in the analysis model by the use of dummy 
variables whereby there are 6 dummy variables representing each of the 
6 co-operative societies. For example, in the case of the Ngariama dummy 
variable (DNGMA) the qualitative effect is determined by using 1 in all 
Ngariama factories and 0 for all the other factories, and so on for all 
the six societies in the computer program. The result gives 6 different 
intercepts, Di to De as in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. For an explanation on 
the use of dummy variables to handle qualitative determining factors 
see Theil (1971), Goldberger (1964) and Johnston (1963). 
The six dummy variables, one for each society, and size of 
co-operative coffee factories were regressed on costs, m.embers' returns, 
profits and unit prices, respectively, measured in K.shs. per tonne of 
clean coffee marketed and the results are shown on Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 
and 4.5. The curves for these equations are found in Figures 4.11, 4.12, 
4.13 and 4.14 respectively. 
It is clear from Tables 4.2 to 4.5 that the society efficiency 
factors are significant to .0005 level of significance but before 
confirming the effect of the society efficiency it must be ascertained 
that t- and F-distribution can be validly used to test the hypothesis. 
It was earlier pointed out that if autocorrelation in ei exists both 
t- and F- tests are invalidated and it is, therefore, necessary to test 
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FIGURE 4.13 
UNIT PROFIT AND OUTPUT OF FACTORIES WITH 
THE SOCIETY EFFICIENCY FACTOR INCORPORATED 
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whether, even after including the society efficiency factor as an 
additional variable to the model, the autocorrelation in ei still 
persists. This, once again, is done using the Durbin-Watson statistic -
see Table 4.6. 
This then shows that there is no autocorrelation in ei and as 
such F- and t- test can be used to test the hypothesis on the study 
without invalidating the results. In addition, Table 4.7 shows that 
there has been a considerable improvement in "goodness" to fit because 
the coefficient of determination has been considerably increased. 
This shows that there has been considerable reduction in "unexplained" 
variation. "If R^ is less than 0.5, there is little strength in the 
explanation, although if we were merely checking to see if X has some 
sort of effect on Y then R^ = 0.5 could be looked upon as a hint" 
(Morley, 1972). In all the cases R^ is greater than 0.5 after inclusion 
of the society efficiency factor as an additional variable. 
The t-test can now be used to test the significance of the 
output coefficients and as is shown on Tables 4.2 to 4.5 the society 
efficiency factors are highly significant and, as such, they affect 
the performance of the factories considerably. Also the accompanying 
equations show that the coefficients for the size and size squared 
of the factories are significant to 5 per cent significance level and, 
as such, the performance of the co-operative factories in case of costs, 
members' returns, profit and unit price, in K.shs. per tonne of clean 
coffee processed, is affected significantly by the factories' size. 
To confirm the significance of the society efficiency factor 
further, an additional test, the F-test, is used. For details see 
Johnston (1963), and for a practical example see Etherington (1970). 
The test is carried out on Table 4.8. 
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TABLE 4.2 
THE SOCIETY COST EFFICIENCY FACTOR - TEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE: 
28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
Society Di Standard Error 
t-
Statistic 
Value 
t.0005 
Is the 
Society 
Efficiency 
Factor 
Significant? 
Rank 
Ngariama 3587.6582 367.1587 9.7714 3.674 Yes 5 
Kabare 3181.6088 354.9162 8.9643 II Yes 1 
Baragwi 3525.8107 371.7498 9.4843 II Yes 3 
Mutira 4063.7710 367.8905 11.0461 II Yes 6 
Kibirigwi 3539.3596 351.4870 10.0696 M Yes 4 
Mwerua 3420.3469 348.4750 9.8151 II Yes 2 
Yi = Di 
(i=l,6) 
71.7324X 
Se = 19.9578 
t = -3.5941 
.7434X^ 
Se = .2664 
t = 2.7904 
. . . (4.2) 
= .6188 
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TABLE 4.3 
THE SOCIETY ME^^BERS' RETURNS EFFICIENCY FACTOR - TEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE: 
28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
Society Di Standard Error 
t-
Statistic 
Value 
t.0005 
Is the 
Society 
Efficiency 
Factor 
Significant? 
Rank 
Ngariama 3389.3879 572.5841 5.9194 3.674 Yes 5 
Kabare 3699.9167 553.4918 6.6846 II Yes 4 
Baragwi 4196.8919 579.7439 7.2392 II Yes 2 
Mutira 4313.8081 573.7252 7.5189 II Yes 1 
Kibirigwi 2759.2435 548.1440 5.0337 II Yes 6 
Mwerua 4168.9996 543.4468 7.6714 II Yes 3 
Y2 = Di 
(i=l,6) 
+ 74.5314X 
Se = 31.1242 
t = 2.3946 
.7923X^ 
Se = .4155 
t = -2.1069 
. . . (4.3) 
= .5478 
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TABLE 4.4 
THE SOCIETY PROFIT EFFICIENCY FACTOR - TEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE: 
28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
Society Di 
Standard 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Value 
t.0005 
Is the 
Society 
Efficiency 
Factor 
Significant? 
Rank 
Ngariama 4484.8160 563.0568 7.9651 3.674 Yes 2 
Kabare 4083.7481 544.2822 7.5029 
II Yes 5 
Baragwi 4223.5526 570.0974 7.4084 
II Yes 3 
Mutira 4838.9188 564.1789 8.5769 
II Yes 1 
Kibirigwi 2208.1614 539.0233 4.0965 
II Yes 6 
Mwerua 4200.1771 534.4043 7.8595 
II Yes 4 
Yo = Di 
(i=l,6) 
73.9273X 
Se = 30.6064 
t = 2.41542 
= .7370 
.7846X2 
Se = .4085 
t = -2.1204 
. . . (4.4) 
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TABLE A.5 
THE SOCIETY UNIT PRICE EFFICIENCY FACTOR - TEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE; 
28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
Society Di Standard Error 
t-
Statistic 
Value 
t.0005 
Is the 
Society 
Efficiency 
Factor 
Significant? 
Rank 
Ngariama 6241.6227 786.0438 7.9405 3.674 Yes 2 
Kabare 5554.7131 759.8339 7.3104 I I Yes 5 
Baragwi 5976.4414 795.8727 7.5092 I I Yes 4 
Mutira 7087.2675 787.6103 8.9984 I I Yes 1 
Kibirigwi 4026.5083 752.4924 5.3508 M Yes 6 
Mwerua 6103.3979 746.0440 8.1810 I I Yes 3 
Y,, = Di + 100.0891X 
(i=l,6) [Se = 42.7274 
t = 2.3425 , 
r2 = .6187 
1.2038X^ 
Se = .5704 
t = -2.1105 
. . . . (4.5) 
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TABLE 4.6 
DURBIN-WATSON TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION; 
28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
Dependent 
Variable d 
5% Level of 
Significance 
Is there 
Positive Serial 
Correlation? dl du 
Unit Costs 1.8024 1.35 1.59 No 
Unit Members' 2.3251 I I I ! No 
Returns 
Unit Profit 2.3322 I I I I No 
Unit Price 2.3528 I I I I No 
TABLE 4.7 
COMPARISON OF COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION (R^) 
Dependent Variable 
Before including 
the Society 
Efficiency Factor 
After including 
the Society 
Efficiency Factor 
Unit Costs .4164 .6188 
Unit Members' 
Returns .1560 .5478 
Unit Profit .2325 .7370 
Unit Price .1547 .6187 
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TABLE 4.8 
RESULTS OF THE F-TESTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE 
SOCIETY EFFECT IN THE MODEL 
Dependent 
Variable 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
F-
Ratio F.025 
Is the 
Society 
Effect 
Numerator Denominator Significant? 
Unit Costs 28 33 2.17 2.14 Yes 
Unit Members' 
Returns 
28 33 3.18 II Yes 
Unit Profit 28 33 7.12 II Yes 
Unit Price 28 33 4.46 II Yes 
Note to the Table; The F-Ratio used is F = q ^ / ( M - N - K ) 
Where Qiis equal to the residual sum of squares in a model without 
Society Effect and Q2 is equal to the residual sum of squares in a 
model with Society Effect. M is the number of observations, N is 
number of societies and K is the number of output coefficients 
(see Etherington, D.M., (1970), Chapter IV). 
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The society efficiency factor, therefore, significantly 
affects the performance of the factories and as such equations 4.2 to 
4.5 seem almost likely to be the final form of the model. But before 
taking up these equations as the final form of the model another 
additional variable which was thought to affect the factory performance 
substantially was included. This additional variable is output/cherry 
ratio, which would reflect on the standard of grading of the cherry in 
each factory. Then output/cherry ratio, the six dummy variables and 
size of factories were regressed on costs, members' returns, profit and 
unit prices, in K.shs. per tonne of clean coffee, respectively. The 
coefficient for the output/cherry ratio was insignificant, and so was 
the society average of output/cherry ratio. Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 
and 4.18 show that the result was not surprising. Another attempt to 
include quality of clean coffee processed as an additional variable 
of the cost function also failed. Equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and 
(4.5) were then taken as the final form of the model for analysis in 
this study. 
In addition to accepting the above equations as the final 
form of the model, it should be noted that the society efficiency 
rankings in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are different in all cases. 
The importance of these rankings will be discussed below. 
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FIGURE 4.16 
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FIGURE 4.17 
SOCIETY (PROFIT) EFFICIENCY FACTOR 
AS COMPARED TO OUTPUT/CHERRY IN FACTORIES 
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3. X-Efficiency 
There are four different society efficiency factors and each 
of them seems to measure a different form of efficiency. The efficiency 
indices on Table 4.9 have been calculated from Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 
4.5, and their rankings are shown on Table 4.10. The cost index ranks 
the societies according to their cost structure, the lowest cost first, 
and so on. The profit index ranks the societies according to their 
unit profits while the members' returns index, sometimes referred to as 
the "co-operative efficiency", ranks the societies according to the 
magnitude of their members' returns, the highest first, and so on. 
Lastly, the unit price index ranks the societies according to the 
quality of clean coffee processed, and this is sometimes referred to as 
the "technical efficiency". 
The profits and, in the last analysis, members' returns are a 
function of both the costs of processing the cherry and the price 
received for the resultant clean coffee. Interestingly, in this case, 
costs may affect the price received through quality because on examining 
Figure 4.19, it seems that the societies of the relatively higher cost 
structure process better quality coffee than those of the relatively 
lower cost structure. This would, therefore, suggest that it requires 
extra funds to improve on the quality of clean coffee. This 
proposition is statististically confirmed by using rank correlation 
(see Table 4.11) and, therefore, the higher cost structure co-operative 
factories would, generally, tend to market higher quality coffee. 
This is not unexpected because higher quality coffee calls for timeliness 
and thoroughness of operations and this would mean higher costs per tonne 
of clean coffee processed. 
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TABLE 4.9 
EFFICIENCY INDICES 
Society Cost Index 
Quality 
Index 
Profit 
Index 
Members' 
Returns Index 
Kabare 100.0 78.4 84.4 85.5 
Mwerua 92.5 86.1 86.8 96.7 
Baragwi 89.2 84.3 87.3 97.8 
Kibirigwi 88.8 56.8 45.7 64.0 
Ngariama 87.3 88.1 92.7 78.6 
Mutira 72.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes to the Table; 
The Efficiency Index Mi is calculated using the formula below: 
Mi = 100 - X 100 
where Di is the efficiency factor of the i^^ society in any of 
the four efficiency indices. All values of Di are shown on 
Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. 
Dj represents the most efficient society in any one case. 
TABLE 4.10 
EFFICIENCY RANKING 
Society Cost Quality Profit 
Members' 
Index Index Index Returns Index 
Kabare 1 5 5 4 
Mwerua 2 3 4 3 
Baragwi 3 4 3 2 
Kibirigwi 4 6 6 6 
Ngariama 5 2 2 5 
Mutira 6 1 1 1 
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FIGURE 4.20 
COST VERSUS PROFIT EFFICIENCY INDICES 
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The extra costs used to improve quality could only be justified 
if the extra revenue due to improved quality outweighs the costs. On 
examining Figure 4.20 it seems that, generally, the societies of the 
relatively higher cost structure realise higher profits than their lov/er 
cost structure counterparts. Using the rank correlation test (see 
Table 4.12) on costs and profits, this proposition is confirmed and, 
therefore, the implication is clear that the extra costs of improving 
quality are outweighed by the higher price received. It should, 
however, be noted that Kibirigwi is a society with intermediate cost 
ranking but extremely low quality and profit indices. It must be 
regarded as highly inefficient. 
It is clear from these relationships and the rankings in 
Table 4.10 (and scatter on Figure 4.21) that there is a higher degree 
of correlation between quality and profits. The formal rank correlation 
coefficient is .94 (see Table 4.13) which is highly significant. The 
co-operative factories, therefore, should be encouraged to go for higher 
quality and the other societies should learn from Mutira which seems to 
have exploited the situation favourably. The various points to watch 
during processing will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
TABLE 4.11 
CALCULATION OF RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN 
COST AND QUALITY INDICES RANKINGS 
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Society Cost Index Quality Index di di^ 
Kabare 1 5 -4 16 
Mwerua 2 3 -1 1 
Baragwi 3 4 -1 1 
Kibirigwi 4 6 -2 4 
Ngariama 5 2 3 9 
Mutira 6 1 5 25 
Idi^=56 
Notes to the Table: 
The null hypothesis being tested is that the rank correlation 
coefficient in the population is zero or that the observations in 
the population are independent. 
The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
= 1 - ^ T ^ l ) 
where di denotes the difference between the corresponding 
rank of the observation, and n = the size of the population, in 
our specific case n=6. (See Yamane, T., (1970) and Dixon, W.J., et al. 
(1957) for details on rank correlation.) 
Dixon (1957) shows that with a sample sized 6 there is a 12.1 per 
cent chance that Edi^>56. Cost index, therefore, has a negative rank 
correlation with quality index. The rs corresponding to Zdi2=56 is 
-.6. 
TABLE 4.12 
CALCULATION OF RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN 
COST AND PROFIT INDICES RANKINGS 
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Society Cost Index Profit Index di di^ 
Kabare 1 5 -4 16 
Mwerua 2 4 -2 4 
Baragwi 3 3 0 0 
Kibirigwi 4 6 -2 4 
Ngariama 5 2 3 9 
Mutira 6 1 5 25 
Zdi^=58 
Notes to the Table; 
Dixon (1957) shows that with a sample sized 6 there is an 
8.8 per cent chance that Edi^^58. Cost index, therefore, has a 
negative rank correlation with the profit index. The rs 
corresponding to Zdi^=58 is -.65. 
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FIGURE 4.21 
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FIGURE 4.22 
QUALITY VERSUS MEMBERS' RETURNS EFFICIENCY INDICES 
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On carrying out a rank correlation test on quality and 
members' returns (see Table 4.14 and also the fairly wide scatter 
of these observations on Figure 4.22) it seems unlikely that all the 
profits are paid to the members. This is because the rank correlation 
coefficient of .60 between quality and the members' returns is lower 
than .94 which is the rank correlation coefficient between quality and 
profit. This breaches one of the principles of co-operation "service 
at cost", discussed in Chapter 2, and it is not surprising because it 
has already been pointed out that the societies withhold funds from 
their members in excess of costs, usually referred to as the "society 
surplus". Such funds are used for investment in businesses that 
are neither relevant to the coffee industry nor in the interest of the 
members, such as purchase of farms and commercial premises and 
prestigious office blocks. 
Were the co-operative societies giving their members services 
at cost, there should have been a rank correlation coefficient of 1 
between the profits and the members' returns. This, however, is not the 
case (see Table 4.15) and this means that some societies are withholding 
funds from their members, but unequally. This is what has introduced 
the fairly wide scatter between profits and the members' returns 
(see Figure 4.23). 
Clearly, members' returns (Rm) can be made up of two parts: 
Rm = Ss + Pf (^-6) 
Where: 
Rm = Members' returns in K.shs. per tonne of clean coffee, 
Ss = Society surplus in K.shs. per tonne of clean coffee, and 
Pf = Factory profit (sales less costs) in K.shs. per tonne of 
rn coffee 
TABLE 4.13 
RANK CORRELATION CALCULATION BETWEEN QUALITY AND 
PROFIT INDICES RANKINGS 
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Society Quality Index 
Profit 
Index di di^ 
Kabare 5 5 0 0 
Mwerua 3 4 -1 1 
Baragwi 4 3 1 1 
Kibirigwi 6 6 0 0 
Ngariama 2 2 0 0 
Mutira 1 1 0 0 
Edi^=2 
Notes to the Table: 
In addition to notes to Table 4.11, from the tables, 
(Yamane, T. , (1970) p.470), when Zdi^^e, the probability of a 
rank correlation coefficient of zero occurring is 0.0292. But 
our calculation shows Zdi^=2 and, therefore, quality index has a 
positive rank correlation with the profit index. The rs 
corresponding to Zdi^=2 is .943. 
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TABLE 4.14 
RANK CORRELATION CALCULATION BETWEEN 
QUALITY AND MEMBERS' RETURNS INDICES RANKINGS 
Society Quality Index 
Members' 
Returns 
Index 
di di^ 
Kabare 5 4 1 1 
Mwerua 3 3 0 0 
Baragwi 4 2 2 4 
Kibirigwi 6 6 0 0 
Ngariama 2 5 -3 9 
Mutira 1 1 0 0 
Zdi^=14 
Notes to the Table; 
With a sample sized 6 there is a 12.1 per cent chance 
that Edi^-14and, therefore, quality index has a positive rank 
correlation with the members' returns index. The rs corresponding 
to Edi^=14 is .6. 
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TABLE A.15 
CALCULATION OF RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN 
PROFIT AND MEMBERS' RETURNS INDICES RANKINGS 
Society Profit Index 
Members' 
Returns 
Index 
di di^ 
Kabare 5 4 1 1 
Mwerua 4 3 1 1 
Baragwi 3 2 1 1 
Kibirigwi 6 6 0 0 
Ngariama 2 5 -3 9 
Mutira 1 1 0 0 
ld±^=12 
Notes to the Table; 
With a sample sized 6 there is an 8.8 per cent chance that 
Edi^-12 and, therefore, profit index has a positive rank 
correlation with the members' returns index. The rs corresponding 
to Y.d±^=12 is 0.66. 
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FIGURE 4.23 
PROFIT VERSUS MEMBERS' RETURNS EFFICIENCY INDICES 
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Ss could be negative (usually) or positive when a society makes a decision 
to withdraw some funds from the "Reserve Fund" so as to augment the 
factory profits in order to pay their members relatively reasonable payouts. 
Usually this is used to conceal the inefficiency of the factory officials 
from the members, and Kibirigwi did it in 1969-70 because of its very 
poor performance in coffee processing. 
On regressing the six dummy variables and the members' returns 
on the profits, the results on Table 4.16 were obtained. These results 
have been plotted on Figure 4.24. Other than Kibirigwi all the societies 
withheld some funds from their members. This is why Figure 4.24 shows 
all societies, except Kibirigwi, with a negative intercept. From the 
ranking on Table 4.16 it seems as if the societies with relatively 
higher profits withhold relatively more from their members than those 
societies with relatively lower profits. 
This was tested with the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
(see Table 4.17) and a rank correlation coefficient of -.714 was obtained. 
A rank correlation coefficient of -1 shows that there is a perfect inverse 
relationship between profit and society surplus efficiency indices. 
Although our rank correlation coefficient is significant at 0.068 level of 
significance, it clearly shows that the societies with higher profits 
withhold more from their members than societies with low profits. This 
suggests that the inefficient societies are acting as "pace-setters" to 
the efficient ones, and the relatively efficient societies just ascertain 
that their members are slightly better off than those of the relatively 
inefficient societies. 
TABLE 4.16 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROFITS AND 
THE MEMBERS' RETURNS: 29 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
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Society Di Standard Error 
t-
Statistic 
Value 
Ranking 
Ngariama -1166.6090 39.2491 -29.7231 6 
Kabare -448.0703 36.1366 -12.3993 4 
Baragwi - 92.4631 37.2560 - 2.4818 2 
Mutira -597.8201 40.6783 -14.6962 5 
Kibirigwi 513.8414 24.6495 20.8459 1 
Mwerua - 94.5948 36.1434 - 2.6172 3 
Rm = Ssl + 
(i=l,6) 
1.0133Pf 
Se = .00634 
t = 159.7106 
. . . (4.7) 
= .9993 
TABLE 4.17 
RANK CORRELATION CALCULATION BETWEEN THE SOCIETY SURPLUS 
AND THE PROFIT INDICES RANKINGS 
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Society Profit Ranking 
Society 
Surplus 
Ranking 
di di2 
Ngariajna 2 6 -4 16 
Kabare 5 4 1 1 
Baragwi 3 2 1 1 
Mutira 1 5 -4 16 
Kibirigwi 6 1 5 25 
Mwerua 4 3 1 1 
Edi2=60 
Notes to the Table: 
Dixon (1957) shows that with a sample sized 6 there is a 
6.8 per cent chance that Profit index, therefore, has 
a negative rank correlation with the society surplus index. 
The rs corresponding to Edi^=60 is -.714. 
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The DCO should see to it that all the co-operative societies 
give their members services at cost. The higher returns that will be 
obtained by the efficient ones will force the inefficient societies 
to improve on their performance so that they can make their members 
as well off. This, in turn, will act as an incentive to the 
members and the crop husbandry practices will be improved so as to 
improve cherry yields, and quality as well will be improved. This 
will mean higher returns per hectare to the individual member and improved 
factory output levels. The increased factory levels, now that benefits 
of scale economies have been shown to accrue to coffee processing (discussed 
in Chapter 3), will mean that the co-operative factories will be operating 
to capacity. 
4. The Optimum Output Levels 
In a co-operative business,like any other economic organisation, 
the most important thing is not that the factories should operate at 
their capacity, but that they operate at the optimal output level. 
Following the usual economic rationalisation, the optimal level of 
operation of a perfectly competitive firm is at the point where the 
marginal cost is equal to the marginal revenue. For a perfectly 
competitive firm the marginal revenue is equal to the unit price. 
In the co-operative coffee factories, if this optimal level of a two-
disc factory is much higher than what an individual or a few small-scale 
coffee farmers can supply, the members of a co-operative factory would 
be, generally, ill-advised to press for the further fragmentation of 
the existing processing system. The hypothesis of this thesis would, 
therefore, be confirmed if the optimal output level of a two-disc 
factory is much higher than an individual or just a few farmers could 
supply adequately. 
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The useful equation in this case is the cost function, 
equation (A.2) and Table 4.2; it is rewritten for convenience: 
Yi = Di - 71.7324X + . 7434X^ (4.2) 
(i=l,6) 
All the Average Cost Curves in Figures 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27 have been 
drawn using the equation (4.2). The values of Di are found on Table 4.2. 
To derive the marginal cost curves from the above equation, 
equation 4.2 is multiplied by size (Xj) to give equation (4.8): 
YiXi = TC = DiXi - 71.7324X^ + .7434X^ (4.8) 
Where TC = the Total Cost 
The first derivative of equation (4.8) is the Marginal Cost. 
dY i- = MC = Di - 143.4648X + 2.2302X^ (4.9) dXi 
But the optimal output level is where the Marginal Cost is equal to the 
Marginal Revenue, where the Marginal Revenue in each case is the unit price 
obtained by each co-operative society. 
By solving the equality: 
Di - 143.4648X + 2.2302X^ = MRi 
(i=l,6) (i=l,6) 
for all the six Di and MRi, the two-disc factory optimal output levels, 
one for each society, obtained are shown on Table 4.18. These can 
also be obtained from Figures 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27. The figures are 
given to the nearest whole number. 
The Ministry of Agriculture recommends that with good management 
and favourable weather a two-disc factory should process about 500,000 
kilograms of cherry. Taking the district average cherry/clean coffee 
ratio of 6.3 in 1969-70, this comes to about 80 tonnes of clean coffee. 
This figure has, therefore, been confirmed by the results of this study. 
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FIGURE 4.25 
UNIT PRICE, AVERAGE AND MARGINAL COST CURVES 
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FIGURE 4.26 
UNIT PRICE, AVERAGE AND MARGINAL COST CURVES 
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FIGURE 4.27 
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TABLE 4.18 
THE TWO-DISC FACTORY OPTBIAL OUTPUT LEVELS 
Society 
Optimal Output Level 
Tonnes of Clean Coffee 
Processed 
Ngariama 87 
Kabare 86 
Baragv/i 86 
Mutira 87 
Kibirigwi 76 
Mwerua 85 
Note: These are the output levels where Marginal Cost is 
equal to the Average Revenue. It is assumed that 
Marginal Revenue is equal to the Average Revenue. 
It should, however, be noted that the largest factory in 1969-70 
processed 66.1 tonnes and as such the figures on Table 4.18 are 
outside the range of our observations. They are a result of an 
extrapolation and hence they should be treated with caution. All 
the same, these results back up the Ministry of Agriculture claim 
of 80 tonne optimum capacity for a two-disc factory and hence it 
could be concluded that the factories are operating below optimum 
levels. The result of such low levels of operation would be low 
returns to the members. It is, therefore, intriguing to know how 
these co-operating factories, operating at relatively low levels 
of output, have continued to sustain the "interest^'of their members. 
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The explanation is clear. In Section 1 of this chapter 
it was shown that the quality of clean coffee processed, hence the 
unit price, is a function of size (see Figure 4.4). Consequently, 
the Marginal Revenue is not equal to the Average Revenue (unit price) 
and the "optimal" level of about 80 tonnes of clean coffee, above, 
is at the point where Marginal Cost is equal to the Average Revenue 
rather than where Marginal Cost is equal to the Marginal Revenue 
(see points Fi to Fe on Figures 4.28, 4.29 and 4.30). 
It is clear from Figures 4.28, 4.29 and 4.30 that we are 
faced with a sloping, rather than a horizontal, marginal revenue curve. 
The marginal revenue curve is derived by multiplying equation (4.5) 
by Xi, to give a total revenue function below: 
Ya^ = TRi = DiX + 100.08912X2 - 1.20388x3 (4.10) 
Where TRi = Total Revenue of i^ '^  society. 
Equation (4.10) is then differentiated with respect to X^ so as to 
obtain the marginal revenue, equation (4.11). 
= MRi = Di + 200.17824X - 3.61164x2 (4.11) dXi^  
(i=l,6) 
th 
Where MRi = Marginal Revenue of i society. 
To find the optimal output level of a two-disc coffee factory, 
marginal revenue (equation 4.11) is equated to marginal cost (equation 4.9), 
and then solved for the value of X. The resultant optimal output levels 
are given on Table 4.19 (see qi to qe on Figures 4.28, 4.29 and 4.30). 
123 
FIGURE 4.28 
A OPTIMAL OUTPUT LEVEL - NGARIAMA AND KIBIRIGWI 
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FIGURE 4.29 
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TABLE 4.19 
THE OPTIMAL OUTPUT LEVELS OF A TWO-DISC FACTORY 
Society 
Optimal Output Level 
Tonnes of Clean Coffee 
Processed 
Ngariama 66 
Kabare 65 
Baragwi 65 
Mutira 67 
Kibirigwi 61 
Mwerua 66 
Note; These are the points where Marginal Cost = Marginal Revenue. 
From Table 4.19 the optimal output level is about 
65 tonnes of clean coffee. Differences in management do not seem to play 
a very important part in determining the optimal output level because in 
spite of differing managerial efficiency the optimal levels are about the 
same in all societies. The main reason seems to be the fact that the cost 
and the revenue curves are moving on the same direction since the 
improvement of the clean coffee quality involves extra costs (see 
Figures 4.28, 4.29 and 4.30). 
The 65 tonnes optimal level of a two-disc coffee factory is 
substantially lower than the 80 tonnes claimed by the Government as the 
optimal capacity of a two-disc coffee factory. It is possible that in 
determining the optimal capacity level, the Ministry of Agriculture 
officials assumed that marginal revenue is equal to the average revenue. 
This, as already shown, does nothald true in the co-operative coffee 
factories of Kirinyaga because the clean coffee quality, since the unit 
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price, is a function of size of the factory. The district's coffee 
factory policy emanating from this optimal capacity level of a two-disc 
co-operative coffee factory will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
It can, however, be concluded that the smallholder coffee 
farmers would be better off by belonging to a larger co-operative 
factory because the optimal output level has been found to be about 
65 tonnes of clean coffee. In Kirinyaga, there is only one factory that 
operated at this level and in fact one co-operative coffee factory 
processed as little as 10 tonnes in 1969-70. In such circumstances 
and in the light of the present conditions, the co-operative members 
would be ill-advised to disintegrate further the present processing 
system because they would be at a loss. Instead, all possible should 
be done to increase the output of the factories so that they can reach 
the optimal output level where they can serve their members as 
economically efficient organisations. It is felt that the co-operative 
members could improve their cherry yields substantially if they are given 
an incentive. Such an incentive could be in terms of higher returns 
to the members and this, other than through benefits of economies of 
scale, could be achieved through improved quality of clean coffee. 
The cultivation and processing technical recommendations that should 
be adhered to in order to process clean coffee of high quality will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
QUALITY OF CLEAN COFFEE PROCESSED 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that the quality 
of the clean coffee processed is very important because of its effect 
on the price received and hence the profits of co-operatives. In 
addition it was shown that the co-operative factories which process 
relatively higher quality clean coffee have higher unit profits 
although they tend to have higher unit costs. This means that the 
co-operative factories should be advised to maximise the quality of 
the clean coffee processed as long as the costs involved in quality 
improvement do not exceed the extra revenue realised due to such an 
improvement of quality. As pointed out in Chapter 4, this is at the 
point where marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost. These 
optimal scale levels, for a two-disc factory, for different societies 
have already been discussed in Chapter 4. 
Because of the great importance of quality in determining 
the viability of the co-operatives, it is necessary to appreciate 
certain technical aspects of coffe marketing. Clean arabica coffee 
is graded into ten standards, formerly fourteen (Clayton, 1964), and 
each standard commands a premium over the one below. Clayton (1964) 
asserts that the Kenya coffee commands a premium on the world market 
due to its superior quality, and for example in 1960, Kenya coffee on 
average received about K£90 a ton more than the peasant coffee 
produced in Tanzania and Uganda, where husbandry and processing 
standards are low. The average payment rates for all coffee auctioned 
in Nairobi, after deduction of the export tax, for the 1969-70 crop 
is shown on Table 5.1. The price is given in K.shs. per tonne of clean 
coffee auctioned, and this applies to the cumulative differential also. 
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It is, therefore, clear that by processing coffee below 
standard 1, one stands to lose something, and the loss becomes 
astronomically large as the quality of coffee deteriorates. Any 
significant fall in average quality means a disproportionate fall in 
income, mainly due to the two factors of price and export quota (ibid). 
To escape low incomes resulting from low prices and one's coffee being 
subject to the export quota, high clean coffee quality should be 
maintained, preferably in the first three standards because below 
that the clean coffee is subject to export quota (ibid). 
In Kirinyaga, the majority of the coffee factories, on 
average, processed coffee that was below the first three classes (see 
Appendix 10) and hence only a few factories escaped the export quota. 
This could come out more clearly by examining the society averages for 
1969-70 (see Table 5.2). 
The district's clean coffee quality average for 1969-70 is 
standard 6. This shows that, on average,most of the district's coffee 
was subject to export quotas, as well as low prices. A society like 
Mutira must have had much of its coffee in standard 1 in order to attain an 
average of standard 2. Inoi, Kabare, Mwerua and Kibirigwi had 
proportionately less coffee in the first three standards. 
Taking the district's average price of K.shs.7451.40 per tonne 
of clean coffee, the district would have gained an extra K.shs.1450.60 
per tonne had it sold all its coffee, on average, in standard 1, or 
K.shs.8910 per tonne. Some factories in the district actually exceeded 
the national average price for standard 1. For example, Mutitu factory 
of Mutira sold its coffee for an average of K.shs.9970.00 per tonne as 
compared to the national average price for standard 1 of K.shs.8910.00 
per tonne. There is no reason, therefore, why all the factories cannot 
sell the bulk of their coffee in standard 1. The situation is worst for 
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TABLE 5.1 
CLEAN COFFEE FAY RATES - 1969-70 
Standard 
Price Cumulative 
Differential K. Shs. per tonne 
1 8910.00 -
2 8380.00 530.00 
3 7920.00 990.00 
4 7810.00 1100.00 
5 7770.00 1400.00 
6 7390.00 1520.00 
7 2850.00 6060.00 
8 1406.00 7510.00 
9 850.00 8060.00 
10 300.00 8610.00 
Source; DCEO, Kirinyaga. 
TABLE 5.2 
SOCIETY CLEAN COFFEE AVERAGES IN KIRINYAGA - 1969-70 
Price Approximate 
Standard Society K. Shs. per tonne of Clean Coffee 
Ngariama 7978.40 3 
Inoi 7457.50 6 
Kabare 7390.00 6 
Baragwi 7826.20 4 
Mutira 8470.00 2 
Kibirigwi 5637.90 Between 
6 and 7 
Mwerua 7400.00 6 
MEAN 7451.40 6 
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Kibirigwi society which effectively lost K.shs.3272.10 per tonne of 
clean coffee and consequently had to draw K.shs.585.10 per tonne (see 
Appendix 9) from its reserve fund to augment the members' payments. 
Clean coffee quality, therefore, should be theconcern of each 
co-operative coffee factory so as to maximise its members' returns. 
It should, however, be noted that processing of high quality coffee 
calls for a "co-operative" action between the members and the employees. 
This is because "...quality lies primarily in cherry as it comes off 
the tree and the pulping and the drying can do nothing to improve the 
quality, but if undertaken by slack and incorrect methods can do 
everything to ruin it" (Austin, 1956). The members' co-operation is 
required to produce coffee cherry of high quality, as well as higher 
yields, and the employees' co-operation to adhere strictly to the 
recommended processing techniques. 
Clean coffee is graded by liquourers, who examine four main 
qualities: 
(i) Size of the coffee beans, 
(ii) Culture - mainly colour and pest or disease attack , 
(iii) Roast - the aroma, and 
(iv) Taste (Austin, 1956). 
These liquoring qualities mainly depend on: 
(a) Cultivation of the tree, 
(b) Picking at the correct ripeness, 
(c) Thorough washing, 
(d) Proper fermentation, and 
(e) Drying of the parchment (ibid). 
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Each of these factors will be discussed below: 
(a) Cultivation of the tree: 
Having in mind Austin's statement that "quality lies primarily 
in cherry as it comes off the tree", the importance of proper husbandry 
practices cannot be overestimated and everything possible should be 
done to ensure production of good quality cherry which possesses the 
very much desired acidic nature of Kenya arabica (Clayton, 1964). 
This depends on the farmers adhering to the recommended cultivation 
practices and the coffee factory field committees ensuring that the 
members adhere to the recommended practices strictly. The main 
cultivation practices include: 
(i) Coffee establishment, 
(ii) Fertiliser application, 
(iii) Disease control, 
(iv) Timely and proper pruning, and 
(v) Timely weeding. 
Each of these practices will be commented on briefly. 
(i) Coffee establishment -
The initial planting of coffee by Africans in Kenya was 
under very strict control but these were later relaxed. Walters 
(undated), summarises the establishment of the smallholder coffee 
industry as follows: 
"The rigid controls were still applied, and all initial 
plantings were limited to 100 trees per individual. 
Permission to plant was only given after a rigorous 
examination of each individual's qualifications to maintain 
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coffee to the satisfaction of the Department of 
Agriculture's local inspector." 
This situation, however, seems to have persisted only in the 
1950s because -
"In the early 1960s there were widespread reports that 
planting of coffee was to be restricted, if not banned 
altogether, so that Kenya might conform to the requirements 
of the International Coffee Agreement as soon as she had 
obtained her independence from Britain. The result of 
these reports was a rapid increase in planting by the 
smallholders. All the available seedlings in the local 
nurseries were planted out, every stick of immature plants, 
and when this source was exhausted seedlings were imported 
illegally from Tanzania and also acquired from the estates" 
(ibid). 
Amidst this confusion, the controlled establisliment of the 1950s 
could not be enforced because as Clayton (1964) suggests, the 
very rapid establishment "...tended to spread more thinly the 
technical officers". 
The pre-1960 smallholder coffee could, therefore, be claimed 
to be better established than the post-1960 coffee, and up to this 
day the coffee farmers in the district admit that they obtain 
higher yields and cherry of bigger sizes from their pre-1960 
coffee, also that it stands drought better than the post-1960 
coffee. 
It is, therefore, admitted that there is an impediment to 
good quality coffee resulting from poor establishment of post-1960 
coffee trees but this is assumed to affect all the factories equally, 
and any differences in quality of clean coffee processed by the 
factories is attributed to the other cultivation practices enforced 
by the factories' field committees and to the standard of processing 
undertaken by each factory. 
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(ii) Fertiliser application -
Due to the break-up of the nutrient re-cycling process in 
coffee resulting from harvesting of coffee cherry, the trees have 
to be given an additional source of nutrients. The accepted means of 
doing it is by fertiliser application, both chemical and organic. 
On organic manures, Haarer (1962) says: "Though organic manures 
show response, in general the response is not enough to warrant 
the expense of using such manures." He goes on to say that even 
rich farmyard manures do not increase yields to any significant 
extent, because there is a strong likelihood that they would encourage 
a leafy and soft growth at the expense of the fruit. He concludes 
that part of the benefit derived from the application of bulk 
organic manures is found in their moisture conserving properties 
as a mulch and that their beneficial action is in preserving soil 
texture rather than in their feed value. 
But even then some coffee farmers have been applying farmyard 
manure resulting from their livestock enterprise of the widely 
practised mixed farming system. As labour becomes more scarce, 
however, heaps of wasted farmyard manure beside cattle sheds are 
not rare in the district. Their place is quickly being taken by 
the chemical fertilisers. 
The necessary elements to the coffee growth include nitrogen, 
phosphorus, potassium, calcium, magnesium, sulphur, iron, manganese, 
boron, zinc, copper and molybdenum (Haarer, 1962). All of these 
elements except nitrogen are usually found in sufficient quantities 
and their deficiency symptoms in coffee are rare (ibid). 
Nitrogen deficiency symptoms in coffee (leaves turning a 
bright green to yellow) are common after harvest and during the 
dry season. But after a long period of drought the nitrogen content 
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of the coffee plant increases rapidly with the beginning of the 
wet season and new growth and flowering follow. It is after 
this that the nitrogen content drops considerably (ibid). 
Consequently, the first nitrogen fertiliser application should 
be added once the wet season starts but not too far into the wet 
season, so as to minimise the losses through leaching, and the 
second application, a vital one, towards fruit time as the ripening 
begins. The type of nitrogen fertiliser, sulphate of ammonia or 
calcium ammonium nitrate, to apply depends on the soil pH. Sulphate 
of ammonia should be applied in soils of high pH while calcium or 
sodium nitrate should be applied in soils of low pH. The quantities 
to be applied depend on the inherent soil fertility, and the Ministry 
of Agriculture recommendations vary from district to district. 
Table 5.3 shows the recommendations for Kirinyaga district, and also 
the estimated crop in tonnes of clean coffee per hectare and in 
kilograms of cherry per tree. 
It is, however, apparent that the co-operative coffee factories, 
through their field committees, have not suceeded in enforcing a good 
standard of fertiliser application because in conclusion to an 
economic study in Kirinyaga by the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, the need for more fertiliser was clearly pointed out. 
It is, however, difficult to supervise fertiliser application 
and this could be encouraged only by member education and increased 
incentives in the form of higher coffee cherry prices and lower 
fertiliser prices. 
TABLE 5.3 
FERTILIZER RECOMMENDATIONS IN COFFEE FOR KIRINYAGA DISTRICT 
Amount of Crop Estimated 
in the Current Season 
Kgs of 
Nitrogen 
per 
Hectare 
Kgs of Fertilizer per Hectare Cms of Gertilizer per Tree 
21% 23% 26% 21% 23% 26% 
Moderate Crop: 
Less than 1.250 tonnes of 
clean coffee per hectare 
or less than 6 Kgs of 
cherry per tree or 
7980 Kgs of cherry per 
hectare -
90 439 390 345 330 300 260 
Good Crop: 
1.250 to 1.900 tonnes of 
clean coffee per hectare 
or 6 to 9 Kgs of cherry 
per tree or 7980 to 11,970 
Kgs of cherry per hectare -
110 530 480 430 400 360 320 
Heavy Crop: 
Over 1.900 tonnes of 
clean coffee per hectare 
or over 9 Kgs of cherry 
per tree or over 
11,970 Kgs of cherry 
per hectare 
160 760 695 615 570 520 460 
U) CT> 
Source: DCEO, Kirinyaga. 
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(iii) Disease control -
There are two main coffee diseases in Kirinyaga which are 
given a lot of attention, namely. Coffee Berry Disease (CBD) and 
Leaf Rust (Granel, 1969). 
The CBD, a fungus disease (Colletotrichum coffeanum), attacks 
the green berries at any stage of their development, causing a 
dark brown rot which usually penetrates into the interior and 
destroys the beans. Eventually the whole berry dries out and 
looks like dried cherry coffee, "Buni" (Haarer, 1962). Quite 
often the base of the berry and the top of the fruit stalk are 
the first involved and this causes considerable shedding of 
immature cherries. Although well-managed plots can be hit by 
CBD, neglect of pruning and weedy conditions promote it. Also 
its general relationship to high altitudes has been clearly 
demonstrated, and the association with cold, wet conditions 
confirmed (ibid). 
Leaf Rust (Hemileia vastatrix) is not as dreaded as the CBD 
in Kirinyaga, although it is "the most important and dreaded 
coffee disease in the world" (ibid). It wiped out, or nearly 
did, the coffee industry of Ceylon. It attacks the leaves and 
the tree's ability to make plant food is impaired. 
To control both diseases, the Ministry of Agriculture 
recommends eight sprays using 20 Kgs of copper fungicide (50 per cent) 
and 8 Kgs of Captafol (80 per cent) per hectare in 4 sprays, these 
constituting the first phase. The second phase includes use of 
16 Kgs of Difolatan per hectare in 4 sprays (Granel, 1969). In 
conclusion to its study, the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning team concluded that: "Finally, it appears that the 
standard of spray is very low" (ibid). The team added that the 
official recommendation should be diversified according to the 
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ecological zone because CBD is more serious at higher than at 
lower altitudes. It should, however, be noted that the above 
chemical spray recommendations are not a cure but a prevention. 
The Ministry of Agriculture has distributed a spray program and 
this should be strictly followed. 
(iv) Timely and proper pruning -
The main aims of pruning and desuckering (removing suckers), 
are to avoid overbearing, which results in low grade cherries, 
and to help make sprays more effective (ibid). It is often 
claimed that the coffee farmers are paid according to their 
cherry deliveries irrespective of the grade of cherry delivered, 
thus removing the need to stop overbearing through timely and 
proper pruning (ibid). This, however, is not true for Kirinyaga 
because when a member delivers his cherry to a coffee factory 
he is required to grade his cherry into three main categories, and 
his cherry is not accepted until his grading is approved by a cherry 
inspector. These three grades are: 
(i) Average and above average sized and timely 
harvested cherry - Grade I 
(ii) Below average sized and overripe 
cherry - Grade II 
and (iii) Unripe (Buni) and also unfilled 
cherry ~ Grade III 
Each of the grades is weighed and recorded separately and also 
Grades I and II are processed separately while Grade III is dried. 
The prices during payouts are highest for Grade I, followed by Grade 
II and so on. 
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Poor pruning which promotes over-bearing, increases the 
proportion of Grade II, and also, due to the difficulties in 
making disease control effective, shedding of unripe cherry due 
to CBD attack increases the proportion of Grade III. It is, 
therefore, in the interest of the farmer that his coffee should 
be pruned timely and properly. Although the Society and Factory 
Field Committees have the responsibility of supervising all field 
practices including pruning, it is apparent that they have not 
been successful because pruning in Kirinyaga leaves a lot to be 
desired. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning team which suggested that in order to improve on 
coffee production in the district, overbearing, caused by bad 
pruning has to be avoided (ibid). 
In addition to economic considerations, especially of labour 
shortage, due consideration should be given to the coffee tree when 
deciding on the appropriate time to prune coffee. Pruning is usually 
carried out after harvesting because the large labour force that 
was involved in harvesting is now available. But this alone is not 
enough because it does not take into account the requirements of 
the coffee tree itself. Pruning is best done when the tree has 
naturally begun to make new growth, but not when the growth is 
mature, nor when the buds of ripened wood are "deciding" whether 
to break out into blossom or new growth. The flower buds begin 
to spike with the first shower of the new season following a dry 
spell, and hence pruning should not be done before or during this 
time (Haarer,1962). 
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(v) Timely weeding -
Weed control reduces the competition for plant nutrients. 
Weed growth varies with the amount of rainfall and so do the 
weedings recommended. In Kirinyaga, for example, the coffee 
fanners from the upper areas are recommended to do four to five 
weedings, while those from the lower areas are recommended to 
do three or four. 
Weeding is one of the easiest measures to enforce because 
the coffee factory field committees only need to ascertain whether 
the coffee plots are weeded or not, whereas in the case of fertiliser 
application and disease control, they find it difficult to find out 
how much fertiliser has been applied or how many times a crop has 
been sprayed. This has resulted in good standards of weeding and 
most farmers do it properly (Granel, 1969). Weeding should, at 
the latest, be done before the weeds flower so as to control 
rejuvenation. 
In conclusion to its economic study, the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning Survey Team summed up the standard of cultivation 
of practices in Kirinyaga as follows: 
"There is room for improvement in coffee production on 
the smallholdings in Kirinyaga district. The main points 
to be underlined to achieve this improvement are: 
- apply more fertiliser or manure 
- according to each ecological zone, make the 
correct number of sprays with the right 
chemical 
- avoid overbearing caused by bad pruning. 
If such remarks were listened to it could be possible to 
double the production per acre of the worst growers" (ibid). 
The average of what the study refers to as the "worst growers" was 
2.5 Kgs (5.76 lbs) of cherry per tree in 1968-69, which is above the 
2.1 Kgs district average for 1969-70. 
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(b) Picking at the correct ripeness: 
Although this is usually regarded as a cultivation practice, 
it is of great importance as far as coffee quality is concerned and 
requires special mention. If coffee cherry is picked before its correct 
ripeness, it is treated as "under-ripe" and if it exceeds its correct 
ripeness, it is treated as "over-ripe". Because of an acid quality, 
Kenya arabica is much favoured as a blending coffee, but only when 
it falls within the first three standards (Clayton, 1964). If picked 
under-ripe,it does not have the required acid qualities, and even after 
processing, this will be identified by the liquourers, and will be of 
a lower grade. If picked over-ripe, on the other hand, the cherry tends 
to ferment inside the cherry skins, and when it is fermented again 
during processing, it loses its colour and acid qualities due to 
over-fermentation. On drying the over-fermented coffee, the ultimate 
bright, bluish-green colour is not achieved and the parchment tends to 
be dull and brownish (Haarer, 1962). 
It is, therefore, vital that coffee is picked at the correct 
ripeness and delivered to the factory immediately because if stored in 
bags for longer than twelve hours after picking, it would start 
fermenting spontaneously. Any over-ripe cherry should be separated 
(Grade II) and processed separately, while the under-ripe cherry should 
also be separated for drying as "Buni". 
(c) Thorough washing; 
After pulping, that is, removing the outer peelings, the parchment 
is washed (usually referred to as pre-washing to differentiate it from 
the washing after fermentation) in concrete channels and a rough grading 
carried out before fermentation. Opinion, however, is divided over the 
advantages and economics of pre-washing. Those who favour it claim that 
if the bean is not washed before fermentation, over-fermentation is very 
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likely. The rough grading undertaken during pre-washing is claimed 
to be a clear advantage especially in getting rid of bits of pulp and 
"floaters" (antestia attacked beans especially) before the good coffee 
flows into the fermentation tanks. 
Its opponents, however, claim that the practice is wasteful of 
labour and tends to wash away some of the mucilaginous matter containing 
sugars on which a good ferment depends. Consequent upon this 
washing of the sugars, fermentation is prolonged and "it seems that when 
fermentation is prolonged, the more the pulped parchment is in contact 
with water, the more the onion flavour may be developed" (Haarer, 1962). 
If onion flavour does develop, pre-washing, washing during fermentation 
and fermenting under water should be discontinued. All the co-operative 
factories in Kirinyaga pre-wash their coffee before fermentation. 
(d) Fermentation: 
After pulping, the beans are slippery and sticky with 
mucilage on the outside, and this is what fermentation, followed by 
a washing process, is intended to remove before drying the parchment. 
The fermentation, therefore, should be carried out just long enough 
to allow the muciliage to liquefy and dissolve (Haarer, 1962). Once 
adequately fermented, "the slippery, shiny covering to the bean is 
no longer present.... If the parchment is squeezed between the fingers 
the shell-like coverings grate together amidst a sloppy mess and it is 
ready to be washed" (ibid). 
Should an attempt be made to dry coffee without fermentation 
and washing, then the process of drying takes longer. The seeds 
agglomerate together as they dry with the mucilagenous pulp becoming 
tacky, holding moisture and attracting dirt. It may also happen that 
a more further and dangerous fermentation may take place during drying 
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if the coffee parchment has not been properly fermented and washed 
beforehand (ibid). 
In coffee trade raw coffee or parchment is sometimes 
designated by tasters as "over-fermented" or "under-fermented". These 
trade terms are applied to "taints" or recognised tastes - if the 
coffee is over-fermented, the already fermented parchment is left 
lying in a sloppy fluid in which chemical changes have taken place and 
consequently a sourish, vinegar odour begins, and if coffee lies in 
that state unwashed for too long, it is likely to pick up a taint and 
is said to be over-fermented (ibid). If coffee, on the other hand, 
is washed before the removal of all mucilage, the parchment tends to become 
dirty and sticky and is liable to pick up a taint derived from the juices 
of the pulp as it continues to ferment and ultimately dries on the 
parchment covering, giving a liquor that is recognised as "under-
fermented" (ibid). 
Fermentation is, therefore, a crucial stage in deciding the 
quality of coffee and calls for strict cleanliness in a coffee factory, 
careful supervision of the fermentation process and thorough washing 
of coffee at the correct time. "Every means should be taken to see 
that unripe, over-ripe or light coffee cherry is pulped separately from 
the good, sound, ripe cherry" (ibid). This is because over-ripe cherry 
requires a shorter time for fermentation while under-ripe cherry requires 
a longer time for fermentation than the good, sound, ripe cherry. 
(e) Drying of the parchment: 
After coffee is fermented and washed thoroughly, and grading 
is complete, it is drained, called "skin-drying", on portable wire-
mesh trays, before it is carried to the permanent wire-mesh drying 
tables - for details of draining and drying of parchment, see Haarer (1962) 
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It should, however, be noted that parchment should be turned regularly 
so that it dries evenly and quickly and provision for drying facilities 
must be adequate because it should not be laid at more than 1% inches 
thick, preferably less (Haarer, 1962). Badly dried parchment loses 
its quality and in cases where it gets musty and mouldy the liquor 
gets utterly ruined. Such coffee and any over-dried coffee loses 
colour and must be sold at something less than half the price - a 
disastrous end to several years of hard work (ibid). 
These five factors must be adhered to very strictly, 
otherwise a considerable loss in premia may be suffered by producing 
coffee of low quality. In an endeavour to produce coffee of good 
quality that commands premia in the world market, especially standards 
one to three, it must be remembered that "...quality lies primarily 
in cherry as it comes off the tree and the pulping and the drying can 
do nothing to improve the quality, but if undertaken by slack and 
incorrect methods can do everything to ruin it" (Austin, 1956), and 
as such, all possible should be done to adhere strictly to the standard 
techniques of processing and also to encourage the members to produce 
cherry of high quality. This is because it is upon the quality of 
clean coffee and the cost structure that the profitability of the 
co-operative factory depends, and hence the members' returns. It has 
been shown in this chapter that both the cultivation and processing 
standards in Kirinyaga leave a lot to be desired. 
It is felt that if the factory employees do what they 
can to streamline the factory management the resulting improvement in 
quality and hence in profit will be substantial and this will act as an 
incentive to the members who will then, in response, not only improve 
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the quality of cherry produced but also increase their cherry yields 
per hectare and hence their gross returns. Due to increased cherry 
yields, their factories will operate at the optimal scale level and 
their earnings will increase further due to the savings in costs 
resulting from the benefits of economies of scale. The mere 
streamlining of the factory management will, therefore, start a chain 
reaction that will considerably boost the profitability of coffee 
farming and the national economy, coffee being the most important 
agricultural cash earner (see Appendix 12). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Summary; 
The Kenya Government expects the co-operative movement to 
play an extremely important role in agricultural development. She 
looks at co-operatives as a vital means of evoking among farmers a 
sense of responsibility and participation - in marketing and processing 
farm products, in supplying requisites of production, in effecting 
improvements in crop and animal husbandry and in administering credit. 
Despite the fact that the Government feels that the 
co-operatives have direct roots in African traditions, she recognises 
that their extensive use in the monetary sector of the economy will 
involve greater discipline and training than has heretofore been 
necessary. Their potentialities as well as their limitations and 
deficiencies, therefore, must be understood before they can be 
successfully exploited as agricultural development institutions. 
As shown in Chapter 1, the co-operative movement in Kenya 
has been faced by members' dissatisfaction arising from their receipts 
being diminished by corruption, misappropriation of funds and other 
management problems; and by inefficiencies arising from the diseconomies 
of small-scale. This study is mainly involved with the inefficiencies 
arising from the diseconomies of small-scale in the co-operative coffee 
factories. This is clearly reflected by the hypothesis of the study, 
stated in Chapter 1, that the members of a co-operative coffee factory 
are better off by belonging to a larger co-operative coffee factory than 
to a smaller one. Hence the members would be ill-advised to disintegrate 
147 
further the co-operative processing system so as to set up their 
individual processing facilities which operate at a very low output. 
The study, therefore, hypothesises that the relatively larger 
co-operative coffee factories would be more economically efficient. 
The British Colonial Administration, knowing of the success at 
home with the venture of the Rochdale pioneers and co-operatives in 
general, introduced co-operation in East Africa in the 1920s. It was 
shown in Chapter 2 that the co-operative movement in Kenya initially 
flourished only among the white farming community. It only gathered 
pace among the Africans following the introduction of cash crops to 
smallholders. The history of coffee has been briefly outlined in 
Chapter 2. The Colonial Administration rightly felt that it was most 
im.portant to establish a strong co-operative organisation to weld 
the very large numbers of small producers into a corporate body and to 
collect their produce into a bulk and quality which would command the 
interest of buyers and markets. It was shown that co-operative coffee 
factories in particular were promoted as a technical measure to handle 
more efficiently the small quantities marketed by individual African 
producers. 
This Government-monitored development has been shown to have 
suffered from the inexperience of the committee and ordinary members 
of the societies, inadequate training to match the fast development, 
mismanagement and small-scale diseconomies. But all the same, 
notwithstanding their very real difficulties, the co-operatives have 
been the only link peasants have had with the monetary sector, and for 
this reason alone they have continued to sustain interest. It has been 
shown that the Government has tried to solve these difficulties by 
establishing the Department of Co-operative Development (DCD)to supervise 
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the running of the co-operatives, expanding the training facilities 
of the committee and ordinary members as well as the society employees, 
opening the Kenya Co-operative Bank to finance the co-operative movement 
and also by giving the Commissioner for Co-operative Development powers 
over the co-operative movement through the 1966 Co-operative Societies 
Act. There are also expatriate advisers to the movement especially 
from the Norland countries. 
The relevance of Rochdale principles of co-operation to Kenya 
was discussed in Chapter 2 and in spite of the Government intervention 
into the co-operative movement, Kenya's co-operatives could be said to 
belong to the Co-operative Enterprise School. This emanates from the 
fact that the Kenya co-operative movement was introduced by the British 
who are traditional subscribers to the Co-operative Enterprise School. 
Each of the Rochdale principles and their relevance to the Kenya co-operative 
movement was discussed. Of great importance, the principle of "service 
at cost" is not adhered to because the co-operative officials withhold 
funds from their members in excess of costs, in the form of society 
surplus. The principle of neutrality in race, religion and politics was 
shown to have been breached in the early periods of the movement when 
the white farming community formed co-operatives which could not register 
Africans as members. This has been rectified. The principle of democratic 
control was shown to be not adhered to indirectly because the well-to-do 
members can amass many members behind themselves who would vote according 
to the wish of these influential ones. This, in most cases, is not in the 
best interests of the particular co-operative society. 
In Chapter 3 benefits of economies of scale, both internal and 
external, were shown to accrue to the co-operative coffee factories. The 
external ones were shown to arise from the combination of the factories 
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to form co-operative societies and of societies to form the District 
Co-operative Union (DCU). The internal ones arise from the increased 
output of the respective factories. 
Of the internal scale economies, technical, managerial, marketing, 
financial and risk-bearing economies were shown to be important in the 
co-operative coffee industry. Technical economies were shown to arise 
in production situations where larger units increase their capacity 
much more than their material costs. This was found to be true in 
coffee processing because wet coffee processing, in most of its stages, 
uses techniques in which volume, capacity and rates of fluid flow 
are important - hence technical economies are important. Managerial 
economies, on the other hand, were shown to arise due to the fact that 
large increases in capacity often require few extra workers. This was 
shown to be true of the co-operative coffee industry because large 
increases in output of coffee factories, and,in turn, of the societies 
and the DCU,would require very few extra management staff, if any, 
and this, therefore, would reduce the average salary costs per unit of 
output, thus making the factories, the societies and the DCU more 
economically efficient. Also increased output in the factories was 
shown to trigger the need for delegation of detail and functional 
specialisation because the increased output makes it difficult for 
one man, the factory manager, to supervise in detail all processes of 
the coffee factory adequately. 
Although marketing economies, that is, economies in the purchase 
of inputs and sale of coffee, were shown to exist in the co-operative 
sector coffee industry, their exploitation has been very poor. This is 
especially so in the distribution of inputs because the economies of 
large orders were shown to be considerably reduced by the complexity of 
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the distribution process. An alternative was suggested and it will 
be mentioned later as a policy implication. As far as sale of clean 
coffee is concerned, there does not seem to be substantial marketing 
economies because, as seen in Chapter 3, most of the KPCU mill charges 
were shown to be made on per unit basis. 
The financial economies were shown to arise from the fact that 
the red-tape for a small loan undertaken by an individual applicant 
is no different from that for a larger loan undergone by a co-operative 
in securing a loan on behalf of its members, from the Co-operative Bank. 
Also the ease with which a co-operative factory can recover loan 
repayments from its members was shown to be considered of great 
importance by both the bankers and the policy makers due to the reduced 
uncertainty and the cheap credit administrative machinery. 
Lastly, the risk-bearing economies were shown to arise from 
the fact that large firms are often less exposed to risk than smaller 
ones because they can eliminate risks by grouping them. Large firms, 
too, tend to be more stable than smaller ones because they are less 
likely to be overwhelmed, financially, by a purely local catastrophe. 
In the co-operative coffeesector it was shown that the farmers, by 
joining a co-operative factory, forgo the control of processing of 
their crop. In addition, their coffee is pooled with coffee of many 
others, either at an advantage or disadvantage. But the advantages 
seem to outweigh the disadvantages because a co-operative factory 
member receives protection from his factory. For instance, if his 
coffee was hit by the CBD in one season, he would still get inputs 
on credit to revive his crop. A co-operative member also gets services 
of "qualified" staff at considerably lower costs and also his income 
was shown to be well spread throughout the year. 
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In Chapter 4, it was shown that unit costs, unit members' 
returns, unit profit and unit price are a function of size of a 
co-operative coffee factory. Observations of these variables when 
plotted against size lay on a curve of a general quadratic form. 
But in addition, the factories belonging to a given co-operative 
society were shown to lie on a different plane of efficiency from 
those of another society. This was shown to be clearly due to 
unequal benefits of external economies accruing on the factories of 
the different societies. The relative magnitude of the accruing 
external economies was measured by the use of the dummy variables, 
and the different intercept values, one for each society, formed a 
measure of societies' efficiency, termed the Society Efficiency 
Factor. 
Using the Society Efficiency Factors and rank correlation, 
it was shown that the societies of the higher cost structure tended 
to obtain higher quality clean coffee. It was also shoxra that it is 
beneficial to go for higher quality clean coffee, in spite of higher 
costs, because the societies that processed high quality clean coffee 
tended to have higher unit profits. This is due to the fact that 
the extra costs of improving quality are outweighed by the higher 
prices received. 
Although the high unit profits were generally reflected by 
higher unit members' returns, it was shown that the society surplus 
tended to be higher in the case of societies realising higher profits. 
This is because the societies with higher unit profits tended to 
regard those with lower profits as pace-setters, and made sure that 
their members were only slightly better off than those of inefficient 
societies. 
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In Chapter 4, the optimal capacity level of a two-disc 
coffee factory was found to be about 65 tonnes of clean coffee. 
This is substantially lower than the 80 tonnes claimed by the Ministry 
of Agriculture as the optimal capacity of a two-disc factory. This 
figure of 80 tonnes was shown to arise when the marginal revenue was 
assumed to be equal to the average revenue, and the Ministry's officials 
may have made this perfect competition assumption. It was shown that 
the marginal revenue was not equal to the average revenue because 
coffee quality, which determines the unit price, is a function of size, 
and hence the marginal revenue was sloping rather than horizontal. 
Equating this sloping marginal revenue curve and marginal cost, 
65 tonnes of clean coffee was found to be the optimal output level 
of a two-disc co-operative coffee factory. 
It was then shown that only one coffee factory in 1969-70 
operated at this optimal output level and the rest were much smaller. 
This being the case, it was then concluded that the smallholder coffee 
farmers of Kirinyaga would be ill-advised to disintegrate further the 
existing co-operative processing system. Instead, the farmers should 
increase their cherry yields so that their respective co-operative 
coffee factories could operate closer to the optimal capacity level 
(65 tonnes). 
But to increase their cherry yields, the members will have to 
improve their coffee husbandry practices, and they need an incentive 
to do so. The easiest way to trigger an improvement process in the 
co-operative sector coffee industry was shown to be higher payouts 
to the members. Other than from the benefits arising from economies 
of scale, this could only be achieved through higher quality of clean 
coffee. But clean coffee quality improvement was shown to depend on 
153 
both the cherry quality and the coffee processing techniques, and hence, 
this called for a "co-operative" action between the members and the 
factory employees. 
The main cultivation practices to watch were shown, in Chapter 5, 
to be fertiliser application, disease control, pruning and weeding. 
A Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Survey Team concluded that 
there is room for improvement in coffee production in Kirinyaga district. 
They emphasised the same critical factors: fertiliser application, 
disease control and proper pruning. The team felt that if their 
recommendations were adopted production per hectare could be doubled. 
Picking at the correct ripeness was also shown to be extremely 
important. If picked under -ripe, arabica coffee does not have the degree 
of acidity necessary in high quality coffee. If picked over-ripe, 
on the other hand, the cherry tends to ferment inside the cherry skins 
and over-ferments during subsequent factory-controlled fermentation, 
thus losing its colour and acid qualities. 
The factory employees can, however, reduce the danger of low 
quality cherry through strict grading of the incoming cherry, but this 
cannot eliminate it. Unfortunately, grading is sometimes poorly done 
due to the pressure on the employees from the committee officials at 
whose mercy they hold their jobs, and also friends and relatives. 
Of the processing techniques, washing before fermentation 
and the following rough grading shown to be labour-consuming and 
may be uneconomic in the unlikely case of a labour shortage. Fermentation, 
on the other hand should be carried out just long enough to allow the 
mucilage to liquefy and dissolve. If over-or under-fermented, the 
parchment is likely to pick up taints which make its liquor recognisable 
as being either over- or under-fermented. Drying of parchment was also 
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shown to be very important because badly dried coffee loses its quality 
and in cases where it gets musty and mouldy the liquor gets utterly 
ruined. Such coffee and any over-dried coffee was shown to lose its 
colour and is sold at something less than half the price. Drying is, 
therefore, crucial to good clean coffee quality and all recommendations 
should be strictly adhered to. 
It is felt that the co-operative employees should do whatever 
they can to improve the clean coffee quality so that the resulting high 
payouts to members act as an incentive for them to improve the quality 
and yLelds of cherry through improved coffee husbandry practices. This, 
in turn, would mean still better quality clean coffee and would also 
increase the output of the factories, preferably to achieve the optimal 
output level. This would then make the coffee factories more economically 
efficient due to both the increased benefits of economies of scale and 
higher unit prices. This will be to the advantage of the members and 
hence they would be better off. 
2. Policy Implications 
Arising from this study and the conclusions that have been 
drawn, some policy implications that would influence the present 
co-operative coffee sector in Kirinyaga arise. These implications and 
the consequent suggested policy changes are all aimed at improving 
the returns to the owner of the co-operative business, the smallholder 
coffee farmer. They, therefore, seek and suggest ways and means of 
improving the co-operative coffee industry of Kirinyaga, so as to make 
coffee and the coffee co-operative movement much more attractive to the 
farmers who are also the co-operators. 
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Of all the 36 factories studied, only one operated at the 
optimal output level of 65 tonnes of clean coffee per annum. All the 
other 35 factories operated below the optimal level. It is, however, 
quite clear that these co-operative factories cannot increase their 
output without the co-operation of their members. It is clearly 
oversimplistic to conclude that the factories' output should be 
increased so that they could operate optimally. Such a conclusion 
could imply either closing some factories, thus forcing some farmers 
to deliver their coffee to more distant factories, making coffee farming 
even less attractive. Alternatively, and more constructively, a 
co-operative coffee sector improvement process could be initiated along 
the lines shown on the "Systems" diagram on Figure 6.1. 
Starting with the factory, the employees could be encouraged 
to follow the technical processing recommendations strictly by 
the award of a "quality bonus" to all members of staff in the factory. 
Similarly, the award of an annual district trophy and monetary prizes 
to the highest quality coffee factories could be initiated. These 
incentives should continue to be backed by the training and 
supervision of the factory staff by the Ministry of Agriculture officials, 
especially the DCEO. 
The resultant high price due to improved clean coffee quality 
will mean higher returns to the members. The DCO, however, should 
see to it that the societies do not withhold funds from the members 
because this will reduce the intended effect of the quality improvement. 
Through the incentive of the higher payouts, education and the field 
committee supervision, it is expected that the members will improve their 
husbandry practices. The improved coffee husbandry practices will not only 
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FIGURE 6.1 
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increase the yields of cherry, but will also improve the quality of 
cherry delivered to the factories. Provision for credit and inputs 
at lower prices should be made so as to provide another incentive to 
the farmers. 
Credit, especially, should be well-timed so as to coincide 
with the relevant operations for which the funds were borrowed. All 
the same, care should be taken not to make the smallholder coffee 
capital- rather than labour-intensive. The inputs should be available 
on credit to the members when they need them. If all the large scale 
economies existing in the input distribution were fully exploited, 
the input prices would be considerably lower. This would be an 
added incentive to the farmers to improve their coffee husbandry 
practices. As already suggested, the KDCU should construct a store 
at Sagana where all inputs on delivery would be stored. The orders 
of each factory would then be collected on the return journey 
when the society lorry delivers the clean coffee from the respective 
factories to the Kenya Coffee Marketing Board stores, at Sagana. 
This would make the distribution cheaper and more straightforward than 
at present. 
Due to the incentives of credit, cheaper inputs and higher 
payouts, the farmers would be expected to improve their farming 
practices. This, as already pointed out, will not only improve the 
quality of cherry, thus improving the quality of clean coffee, but will 
also increase the cherry yields. The increased cherry yields will, in 
turn, increase the output of the factories so that they can operate 
closer to optimal capacity. The resultant improved efficiency of the 
co-operative factories would add further to returns to members. 
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In 1969-70, the district processed 1,746 tonnes of clean 
coffee. Using the optimal capacity level of 65 tonnes of clean 
coffee for a two-disc co-operative coffee factory, the district would 
have required 28 factories as opposed to the present 44 factories. 
But as was shown in Chapter 5, the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning Survey Team concluded that coffee production could be easily 
doubled in Kirinyaga. This would mean that the district would need to 
increase the number of two-disc coffee factories to 56. The excess 
processing capacity possessed by the district in 1969-70 is shown in 
Table 6.1. 
At the 1969-70 yields per hectare, all the societies 
possessed more processing capacity than they required. In fact, if the 
yields were doubled, only three societies, Ngariama, Inoi and Kabare, 
would have required extra factories (5, 6 and 1, respectively). The 
other societies would be able to handle double the 1969-70 crop 
optimally without requiring an extra factory. 
There is, however, no good reason why during favourable weather 
the district should not achieve the "moderate crop", 1.25 tonnes of 
clean coffee per hectare. On average, this would mean tripling the 
present yields. Such yields have been achieved before: in the peak 
year of 1966-67, the district processed 4,400 tonnes as opposed to 
1,746 in 1969-70 - about 2% times as much. This brings out clearly 
one of the most outstanding limitations of this study, that the study 
is based on one crop year rather than an average, due to lack of data. 
Despite this limitation, however, it is clear that the average would 
have been below the peak year of 1966-67. It, therefore, still appears 
reasonable to conclude that with favourable weather, thorough and timely 
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Average 
0.398 44 28 16 5138 80 36 
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Note; It is assumed that the optimal level of 65 tonnes of clean coffee applies 
to Inoi Society as well as the other societies studied; see Chapter 4. 
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pruning and disease control (especially CBD), and improved fertiliser 
application, the district average yield for 1969-70 could be quadrupled. 
If all the societies, however, achieved the moderate crop 
yields (1.25 tonnes of clean coffee per hectare) and assuming that the 
factories will operate at the optimum, all the societies would need extra 
factories (see Table 6.1). The district would need a total of 80 
factories as compared to the present 44 factories. The district coffee 
factories only seem capable of catering for about half the moderate crop, 
* 
say, about .70 tonnes per hectare. It is only Inoi society which 
seems close to this, and it is, therefore, not surprising that Inoi 
had only one factory at excess processing capacity, in 1969-70. As 
Table 6.1 shows, Ngariama has to increase its yields by nearly half 
and Kabare by more than half, otherwise all the other societies will 
have have to increase their yields by ^times to achieve .70 tonnes 
of clean coffee per hectare which would make the present factories 
operate at the optimal level. 
In the past, the Ministry of Agriculture has suggested that 
to operate optimally, a two-disc factory should be served by about 
80 hectares. But more important than hectarage are the yields being 
realised per hectare of coffee serving a particular factory. If the 
societies achieved the moderate yields of 1.25 tonnes of clean coffee 
per hectare, each two-disc factory would be served optimally by 
52 hectares of coffee. The last column in Table 6.1 shows the 
required hectarage of coffee at 1969-70 coffee yields to serve a 
two-disc factory. The optimal hectarage is different for the different 
societies due to the different average yields realised by each society. 
* The figure of .70 tonnes per hectare is obtained by multiplying 
44 factories with the optimal capacity (65 tonnes) and then 
dividing it with the total co-operative coffee hectarage (4,113 hectares) 
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It is, therefore, clear that to use the existing processing 
capacity optimally, the average yields in the district will have to 
be increased from the present .40 tonnes of clean coffee per hectare 
to .70 tonnes. This will consequently make the factories more 
economically efficient and as a result higher profits would be realised. 
The higher profits will mean higher members' returns and this would 
act as a further incentive to the members and the yields would be 
increased further. The increased yields, above .70 tonnes of clean 
coffee per hectare, would necessitate construction of extra factories. 
As a result, the distances travelled by the members to deliver their 
cherry will be reduced and this will be a further incentive resulting 
from the reduced drudgery since the members have to deliver cherry 
to the factories at their own cost. 
The higher profits will enable the co-operatives to pay 
higher salaries and quality bonuses to the factory employees and this 
will be an incentive to them to improve quality even more. The coffee 
co-operative member would, therefore, realise considerably higher 
receipts as a result of the benefits of economies of scale and improved 
clean coffee quality. 
The conclusions and policy suggestions of this study explicitly 
call for increased cherry yields per hectare of coffee, that is, 
intensification of the smallholder coffee farming. Fortunately, this 
ties up very well with the national coffee policy as stated in the 
Development Plan (1970-74): 
"No further expansion in the area planted to coffee is 
expected over the plan period. On the contrary, yields 
are expected to increase sufficiently to enable the 
1974 production target (64,000 tonnes) to be obtained 
from an area of coffee perhaps 7,000 hectares less than 
the 1968 level." 
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Kenya is faced with severe problems of unemployment, 
widespread underemployment and a rapidly expanding population 
(above 3 per cent per annum) (ILO, 1972)*. Given the fact that 
over 90 per cent of the total population lives in the rural areas, 
it is unlikely that the situation will be greatly improved by 
employment opportunities arising from the "non-agricultural sector 
unless major discoveries of new resources, acting as prime movers, 
are forthcoming". (Etherington, 1965). 
The answer, therefore, must lie in agricultural development, 
and this is not surprising because in 1967 "...agriculture provided 
more than one-third of all wage employment" (Republic of Kenya, 1969). 
But agricultural land is itself a major constraint since "...less 
than 12 per cent of the land area in Kenya is suitable for crop 
production in the present state of technology" (ILO, 1972). Kenya has, 
therefore, to adopt an intensification rather than an expansion policy 
of her land resources^ ''. This, once again, ties up with the conclusion 
of this study and its importance cannot be overstated when it is 
noted that coffee is the most important cash crop in Kenya, contributing 
about "25 per cent of total Gross Farm Revenue and about 30 per cent 
of the value of overseas exports" (Republic of Kenya, 1969). 
* 
// 
The ILO Report on employment, incomes and equality is merely 
the international expression of concern with a well documented 
phenomenon (see Sheffield, J.R., 1966). 
In answer to the ILO Report, the Kenya Government stressed that 
"the programmes that will have the highest priority in the next 
few years are those which will benefit the 60 per cent of 
households earning less than £60 a year. To achieve this, it 
intends to concentrate on agricultural intensification, aiming 
at more efficient use of land and changeover from subsistence 
to commercial farming" (The Guardian, January 5, 1974). 
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Of the 556,600 wage employment opportunities in agriculture 
in 1968, the coffee industry provided wage employment for about 100,000 
people. In 1974, agriculture is expected to increase its wage 
employment opportunities to 725,000 and coffee, therefore, has to 
absorb about 20 per cent of the increase (ibid). How is it going to 
do this? 
The ILO Report on Kenya, calling for intensification of land 
use for both crop and livestock production, suggested that for small-
scale coffee producers an increase of coffee yields by 1,000 lb per 
* 
acre (1 tonne per hectare) would result in an increase in work 
opportunities of about 60,000 man-hour equivalents - a 60 per cent 
increase over the 1968 figure. The Report assumed that by raising 
husbandry standards, for example, mulching, pruning, weeding and 
careful harvesting, each acre of coffee would require an "increased 
work input of 100 man-days as a concomitant to achieving increases 
in yields of about four bags per acre" (ILO, 1972). 
Taking this figure of 100 man-days per acre (250 man-days 
per hectare) of increased work input, the coffee industry in Kirinyaga 
would provide for 1,028,250 (4113 x 250) extra man-days of work input. 
This would go a long way in reducing underemployment, if not unemployment, 
in the coffee areas in the district. 
But, in addition, the improvement of the yields to 1.25 tonnes 
per hectare, as has already been shown in Table 6.2, will necessitate 
an increase of the two-disc factories to 80 as compared to the present 
44. Arising from the increase of 36 more factories and the fact that 
A In 1968-69, 23,264 tonnes of clean coffee were produced by 
54,984 hectares of smallholder coffee. This gives a national 
average of .423 tonnes per hectare (Kenya Coffee, January 1970). 
The "moderate crop" is considered to be 1.25 tonnes per hectare 
and the "good crop" up to 1.9 tonnes of clean coffee per 
hectare (see Table 5.3). 
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TABLE 6.2 
PERLIANENT EIIPLOYEES IN THE COFFEE INDUSTRY 
IN KIRINYAGA - 1969-70 
Society Permanent Employees 
Baragwi 83 
Inoi 122 
Kabare 81 
Kibirigwi 77 
Mwerua 36 
Mutira 61 
Ngariama 157 
KDCU 120 
TOTAL 737 
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factories will operate optimally, the permanent employees, let alone 
the casual labourers during peak periods, will be nearly doubled. 
In 1969-70, the district's co-operative coffee industry 
employed 737 permanent employees (the breakdown for each society and 
KDCU is shown in Table 6.2). The actual figure for casual labour 
man-days is not available but it is at least as high, if not higher. 
If the number of the permanent employees is doubled, this would 
mean about 1,500 people employed in the district's coffee processing 
industry as permanent employees, as well as a considerable number of 
casual labourers. The factories will, therefore, be very important 
rural-based but non-farm sources of employment, and will go a long way 
towards easing one of the main problems of Kenya's economic 
development. It is, therefore, when viewed in this wider context 
of the whole district, and the nation as a whole, that the importance 
of this study, its conclusions and policy recommendations become 
most evident. 
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APPEl^ IDIX 1 
KENYA: PHASED DEVELOPMENT OF CASH CROPS 
Crop Acres 1953 
Acres 
1958 
Acres 
1963 
Acres 
1968 
Coffee 4,000 18,000 43,000 71,500 
Pyrethrum 1,300 12,000 30,000 48,000 
Tea 35 2,000 6,000 12,000 
Pineapples 3,000 10,000 18,000 25,000 
Sugar Cane 200 10,000 25,000 45,000 
Source; Swynnerton, R.J.M.,(1954), p.15. 
APPENDIX 2 
KENYA: AREA UNDER COFFEE BETWEEN 1935 AND 1965 
Year 
Thousand Hectares 
Index 
Ratio 
Estates/ 
Smallholdings Estate Small-holding Total 
1935 48.0 0.4 48.4 116 -
1950 24.0 0.7 24.7 60 97/3 
1955 27.0 3.1 30.1 72 90/10 
1960 28.3 13.3 41.6 100 68/32 
1963 32.0 28.0 60.0 144 53/47 
1965 32.5 50.0 82.5 198 40/60 
Source: Krug, C.A., et al., (1968), p.131. 
1 Hectare =2.47 Acres 
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APPENDIX 3 
KENYA: COFFEE PRODUCTION BETWEEN 1950 AND 1970 
Year Estates Smallholdings 
(Thousand Bags* 
Total 
) 
Index of 
Total 
Production 
(1960=100) 
Ratio of 
Smallholdings 
to Kenya 
Total 
(per cent) 
1950 105.6 2.4 108.0 27 2.2 
1955 204.0 5.0 209.0 52 2.4 
1960 319.0 7.8 397.0 100 19.6 
1961 428.0 127.0 555.0 140 22.9 
1962 415.0 135.0 550.0 139 24.5 
1963 413.0 145.0 558.0 141 26.0 
1964 466.0 252.0 718.0 181 35.1 
1965 403.0 242.4 646.2 163 37.5 
1966 N/A N/A 990.1 249 -
1967 - - 835.2 210 -
1968 - - 689.0 174 -
1969 - - 937.9 236 -
1970 - - 939.6 237 — 
Source: Krug, et al.. (1968), p.132 and Republic of Kenya, 
(1970). Statistical Abstract, Statistics Division, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, p.78. 
* One Bag = 50 Kilograms 
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APPENDIX 4 
KENYA: COFFEE QUALITY, 1957 TO 1965 
Percentage of the Total Crop 
Quality 
1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 
AA 0.20 0.70 1.00 13.00 15.39 21.40 16.30 
PB 5.20 5.20 4.00 2.00 2.86 2.56 2.14 
A 46.60 46.00 44.00 22.00 26.20 24.00 23.00 
B 23.20 27.00 31.00 30.00 31.50 24.00 28.80 
C 6.40 6.10 0.90 10.00 9.50 7.30 10.50 
E 1.85 1.55 1.10 0.48 0.80 2.65 1.98 
TT 5.00 5.00 2,40 8.60 4.40 11.00 8.90 
T 1.50 1.70 1.60 4.20 3.40 3.70 3.90 
First 3 
Classes 
AA, PB 
and A. 
52.00 51.90 49.00 37.00 44.45 47,96 41.44 
Note; Although the percentage of clean coffee in the first 
class rose considerably, there was a substantial fall 
of the percentage of coffee in the first three classes 
which is usually exempted from the quota and for which 
a premium is paid, although higher for class 1. It is 
doubtful whether the rise in class 1 could compensate 
the fall in classes 1 to 3. 
Source: Krug, et al., (1968), p.133. 
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APPENDIX 5 
KIRINYAGA: COFFEE QUALITY, 1969 to 1972 
Percentage of the Total Crop Marketed by Each Society 
Society 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 
1-3 
Classes 
4-6 7-10 1-3 
Classes 
4-6 7-10 1-3 
Classes 
4-6 7-•10 
Ngariama 53.7 42.7 3.6 52.2 45.5 2.3 40.0 58.0 2. 0 
Baragwi 62.6 34.9 2.5 56.6 43.1 0.3 32.0 67.0 1. 0 
Kabare 64.8 34.1 1.1 63.9 35.8 0.3 37.3 61.9 0. 8 
Inoi 75.3 24.1 0.6 66.9 32.9 0.2 30.2 67.7 2. 1 
Mutira 66.7 31.6 1.7 44.4 49.3 6.3 17.0 81.0 2. 0 
Mwerua 71.5 25.8 2.7 58.0 41.6 0.4 37.7 62.1 0. 2 
Kibirigwi 51.3 46.3 2.4 49.5 50.3 0.2 39.8 58.2 2. 0 
Source; District Coffee Extension Officer, Kirinyaga -
Technical File. 
APPENDIX 6 
CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT STATISTICS - KIRINYAGA DISTRICT - 1969/70 
Society Enter-prise 
Year 
of 
Regis-
tration 
Number 
of 
Members 
•u m 
C 0) 0) 0) d n) o 
E r-l C O . 0) e 
CL, W 
Total 
Turn-
over 
(K.shs) 
Share 
Capital 
and 
Reserves 
(K.shs) 
Year 
of 
Last 
Audit 
Out-
standing 
Debts 
Affili-
ated 
with 
KDCU 
Dis-
tance 
to 
KDCU 
(Km) 
Dis-
tance 
to 
Sagana 
(Km) 
Pro-
vided 
with 
Tele-
phone 
End of 
Financial 
Year 
Baragwi Coffee 1953 3,700 83 1,721,000 439,552 1968 12,913 Yes 16 29 No September 
Inoi I t 1954 3,442 122 3,426,000 947,061 1967 56,625 I I Same 28 Yes I t 
place 
Kabare I t 1954 3,244 81 1,947,000 79,210 1967 22,023 I I 9 29 No I I 
Kibirigwi f t 1953 2,120 177 649,000 300,039 1967 18,900 t l 20 18 Yes I t 
Mwerua I I 1954 1,622 36 738,000 580,000 1967 78,894 I t 12 24 Yes I t 
Mutira I f 1954 2,317 61 943,000 79,300 1968 264,399 I I 7 29 No I I 
Ngariama I t 1954 2,848 157 3,184,000 653,336 1967 13,271 I I 25 35 No I t 
Klrinyaga Cotton 1970 8,295 2 1,249,000 107,867 1967 N/A I I 32 32 No December 
Sagana Tobacco 1960 178 6 126,000 90,064 1970 1,679 I I 27 Same Yes July 
place 
S. Ngariama Ranch 1965 802 3 3,500 99,190 1970 2,584 I I 38 48 No September 
Mwea Con- 1968 1,457 15 227,000 333,717 1970 44,091 No 30 31 Yes July 
sumer 
Mwea Savings 1966 N/A N/A N/A 2,289,448 1970 618 M 30 31 Yes December 
& Crpdif 
Mwea Farmers 1966 2,016 2 N/A 81,785 1970 N/A I I 30 31 Yes July 
Kirinyaga Timber 1964 242 1 N/A 21,560 1970 7,508 Yes 24 35 No September 
Gichugu Dairy 1964 642 11 205,600 15,625 1970 6,184 I t 16 29 No I I 
Klrinyaga I I 1964 1,310 12 570,000 21,569 1967 4,387 I I Same 27 Yes I I 
place 
Kianj iru Farmers 1964 46 N/A Inactive N/A N/A N/A Inactive Inactive Inactive Inactive 
L. Ndia I t 1966 122 (1 I t I t I t I t I I I I I I I I 
Murinduko I I 1963 290 I I I t I t I I 11 I t I t I I I t 
Nyangati I I 1962 328 I I I t I I I t I I " I t I I I t 
KDCU Union 1963 Priirrrry 
c „ „ J 
120 1,326,000 1,118,413 1968 178,000 28 Yes 
soci-
eties 
TOTAL - 37,037 789 16,315,100 6,735,756 * 712,173 - - - - -
* All except the inactive ones audited in 1972. 
APPENDIX 7 
STATISTICS ON COFFEE CO-OPERATIVES OF KIRINYAGA DISTRICT - 1969/70 
Society Factories 
Hectares 
of 
Coffee 
Owned 
Cherry 
Intake 
per 
Hectare 
(Kilograms) 
Total 
Cherry 
Delivered 
(Kilograms) 
Cherry/ 
Clean 
Coffee 
Ratio 
Number 
of 
Members 
Hectares 
of 
Coffee 
per 
Member 
Total 
Clean 
Coffee 
Marketed 
(Kilogcain^  
Price of 
Clean 
Coffee 
per 100 
Kilograms 
(K.shs.) 
Ngariama 11 1005 3300 3,316,514 6.5 2848 0.35 513,879 797.84 
Inoi 8 660 3900 2,579,980 5.9 3442 0.19 436,586 745.75 
Kabare 7 624 2602 1,623,609 6.1 3244 0.19 265,729 739.00 
Baragwi 6 774 1785 1,381,600 6.6 3700 0.21 209,348 782.00 
Mutira 4 389 1948 757,864 6.8 2317 0.17 111,410 847.00 
Kibirigwi 4 360 1806 650,318 5.9 2120 0.17 109,631 563.00 
Mwerua 4 301 1909 572,174 5.7 1622 0.18 99,750 740.00 
MEAN/TOTAL 44 4113 2646 10,882,059 6.2 19,293 0.21 1,737,033 745.15 
l-n 
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APPENDIX 8 
CHIEF ACCOUNTANT KDCU COFFEE PAYOUT REPORT - 1971/72 
Society Factory 
Rate - Shs. 
per Kilo 
of Cherry 
% of 
Expenses 
Clean Coffee 
Price 
Shs. per Kilo. 
Inoi Rutui 1.00 15 8.01 
Kaguyu 0.81 20 7.88 
Kiandierl 0.67 24 7.59 
Kaitheri 0.97 15 7.57 
Karla 0.94 17 7.84 
Kariko 0.64 26 7.58 
Ndimi 0.86 17 7.91 
Kerugoya 0.73 25 7.38 
Average 0.86 19 7.79 
Baragwi Mushagara 0.85 17 7.66 
Kagongo 0.97 14 7.11 
Karumand i 0.84 13 7.65 
Ruambiti 0.89 17 7.55 
Klanyaga 0.98 16 7.84 
Nyanja 0.82 17 7.64 
Average 0.87 15 7.56 
Kibirigwi Ragati 0.92 10 7.64 
Nguguini 1.04 11 7.67 
Mukangu 0.95 13 7.69 
Klangai 0.90 12 7.55 
Average 0.95 11 7.63 
Mutlra Kagumo 0.78 14 7.64 
Mugaya 0.81 15 7.18 
Mutltu 0.88 12 7.31 
Ngorano 0.89 15 7.54 
Average 0.84 10 7.41 
Mwerua Kariainl 0.88 10 7.69 
Gathambi 0.77 18 7.63 
Mltondo 0.94 7 7.78 
Getuya 0.89 13 7.70 
Average 0.87 10 7.72 
Ngariama Kiri 0.88 14 7.40 
Rianjue 0.90 15 7.58 
Gituto 0.85 17 7.38 
Kegwa 0.93 14 7.66 
Muburi 0.85 14 7.78 
Muthigiini 0.89 12 7.74 
Gakuyuini 0.87 18 7.88 
Karimikui 0.70 27 7.63 
Kii 0.83 19 8.31 
Kiunyu 0.74 17 7.50 
Kalnamoi 0.73 21 7.62 
Average 0.84 16 7.71 
Kabare Kirlnga 1.10 11 7.77 
Konyu 1.04 9 7.84 
Karaini 0.92 11 7.71 
Kalngombe 0.91 10 7.87 
Koboyo 1.02 11 7.61 
Mukure 0.74 16 7.52 
Mukengeria 1.05 11 7.69 
Average 0.99 10 7.75 
APPENDIX 9 
THE SALES PRICE BREAKDOWN IN K.SHS. PER TONNE OF CLEAN COFFEE - 1969/70 
Society Ngariama Baragwi Kabare Inoi Mutira Mwerua Kibirigwi 
Output in tonnes 
of clean coffee 513.879 209.348 265.729 
436.586 111.410 99.750 109.631 
Average factory 
output - tonnes 46.716 34.891 37.961 
57.198 27.853 24.938 11A 0^8 
Shs. 1 Shs. 1 Shs. 1 Shs. 1 Shs. 1 Shs. 1 Shs. 1 
Sales price -
per tonne 7978.40 100.0 7826.20 100.0 7390.00 100.0 7457.50 
100.0 8470.00 100.0 7400.00 100.0 5637.90 100.0 
Payment to growers 
- per tonne 4992.80 62.5 5733.00 72.9 5367.60 72.5 
4875.70 65.1 5446.20 64.3 5342.80 72.2 4220.00 74.8 
Operational costs 
- per tonne 1890.40 23.7 2076.20 26.5 1644.60 22.2 
1488.50 20.0 2506.10 29.6 2035.00 27.5 20a3.00 35.4 
Surplus or defi-
cit (—) - per tonne 1095.20 13.8 17.00 0.6 377.80 
5.3 1113.30 14.9 516.70 6.1 22.20 0.3 -585.10 -10.2 
BREAKDOWN OF COSTS: 
Operational costs 
— per tonne 1890.40 100.0 2076.20 100.0 1644.60 
100.0 1488.50 100.0 2506.10 100.0 2035.00 100.0 2003.00 100.0 
Staff expenditure 
- per tonne 201.20 10.6 309.10 14.9 
241.50 14.7 227.40 15.3 383.40 15.3 307.30 15.1 363.70 18.2 
Costs of processing 
material - per tonne 480.80 25.4 600.90 28.9 
422.60 25.7 465.90 31.3 744.30 29.7 614.60 30.2 786.50 39.3 
Depreciation costs 
- per tonne 311.40 16.5 321.00 15.5 
195.70 11.9 183.20 12.3 275.70 11.0 228.00 11.2 228.00 11.4 
Union commission 
less salaries of 
graded staff -
per tonne 
261.20 13.8 165.70 8.0 192.90 11.7 192.20 12.9 183.10 7.3 159.00 7.8 175.60 8.8 
Marketing expendi-
ture - per tonne 152.30 8.1 
172.40 8.3 246.90 15.0 167.80 11.3 275.70 11.4 209.60 10.3 138.50 6.8 
Miscellaneous costs 
- per tonne 483.50 25.6 507.10 24.4 
345.00 21.0 252.00 16.9 634.90 25.3 516.50 25.4 310.70 15.5 
APPENDIX 10 
CO-OPERATIVE FACTORIES' DETAILS 
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Ngariama Muthigiini 63.331 4989.60 6084.80 2686.00 4335 1475.20 7560.00 
Kii 62.394 4508.60 5593.80 3750.00 3819 1826.20 7440.00 
Muburi 59.624 5075.30 6170.50 2788.00 3391 1809.50 7980.00 
Kiri 54.616 5158.20 6253.40 2882.00 2778 1986.60 8240.00 
Gituto 51.659 4795.60 5890.80 2223.00 3982 1819.20 7710.00 
Karimikui 46.381 4932.50 6027.70 1311.00 3879 1902.30 7930.00 
Kainamoi 45.223 5125.00 6220.20 2270.00 2278 1979.80 8200.00 
Kegwa 41.589 6337.50 7332.70 1891.00 4007 2317.30 9750.00 
Kiunyu 40.084 4866.40 5961.60 2203.00 2775 1738.40 7700.00 
Gakuyuini 24.552 4150.40 5245.60 2021.00 2471 2314.40 7560.00 
Rainjue 24.426 5167.80 6263.00 3103.00 2796 2646.00 8910.00 
Kabare Kiangombe 66.076 5269.50 5643.30 1719.00 3005 1535.80 7360.00 
Karaini 47.642 5446.40 5820.20 3028.00 2632 1722.70 7370.00 
Konyu 45.287 5550.20 5926.00 1902.00 3002 1552.00 7480.00 
Kiringa 43.990 6306.30 6680.10 1951.00 2662 1505.90 8190.00 
Mukengeria 29.400 4767.60 5141.40 2545.00 2581 1704.60 6850.00 
Kaboyo 18.956 4526.10 4899.90 3426.00 1779 2003.40 7050.00 
Makure 14.378 4288.80 4662.60 1256.00 1820 2146.10 6670.00 
Baragwi Karumandi 52.965 5595.00 5612.00 2240.00 1537 2618.00 8240.00 
Mushagara 47.424 5841.00 5855.00 2270.00 2048 2242.00 8100.00 
Kagongo 45.005 6665.60 6682.60 2157.00 2041 1455.00 9080.00 
Ruambiti 24.653 4257.40 4274.40 1608.00 1212 1917.00 5730.00 
Kianyaga 22.339 5896.60 5913.00 2324.00 1899 1798.90 7830.00 
Nyanj a 16.962 5814.10 5831.10 1305.00 1381 2407.40 7630.00 
Mutira Kagumo 41.423 5180.90 5697.60 1756.00 1513 2372.40 8070.00 
Mugaya 39.915 6188.60 6705.30 1971.00 2760 2189.70 9970.00 
Ngorano 19.358 5977.60 6494.30 1643.00 2310 2505.70 9000.00 
Mutitu 11.714 5258.60 5770.30 1806.00 1572 3964.70 7960.00 
Kibirigwi Ragati 51.302 5214.20 4629.10 1728.00 1799 2090.60 6120.00 
Mukangu 27.690 4272.90 3687.60 1179.00 2435 1610.90 7230.00 
Nguguini 19.978 3477.40 2992.30 1044.00 2485 1957.70 4850.00 
Kiangai 10.661 3144.20 2559.10 2196.00 1186 3542.20 4170.00 
Mwerua Kariaini 45.303 5013.70 5035.90 1301.00 2407 1804.10 6840.00 
Mitondo 27.553 5912.40 5934.60 1186.00 2192 1865.40 8150.00 
Getuya 15.192 5460.50 5482.70 1015.00 2021 2553.00 7800.00 
Kathambi 11.702 5204.80 5227.00 447.00 672 2667.30 7780.00 
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APPENDIX 11 
PRELmiNARY RESULTS 
(a) Dependent Variable - Costs 
Yi = 3504.12306 - 68.54021Xi + .68502X? 
r Se = 363.37529 
t = 9.64326 
Se = 22.31381 
t = -3.07164 
Se 
t 
.30001 
2.28329 
R^ = .416415 
(b) Dependent Variable - Members' Returns 
Y2 = 3680.46968 + 83.58922X2 - .98504x1 
Se = 625.63602 
[t = 5.88276 
R^ = .156078 
Se = 38.41848 
t = 2.17575 
Se = 
It = 
.51654 
-1.90696 
(c) Dependent Variable - Profit (Sales less Costs) 
Y3 = 3580.46409 + 98.03988X3 - .99860x1 
Se = 769.38655 
t = 4.65366 
Se = 47.24578 
t = 2.07510 
Se = 
t = 
.63523 
-1.57202 
R^ = .232540 
(d) Dependent Variable - Unit Price of Processed Coffee 
Yu = 5436.11764 + 123.33225X4 - 1.44651X^ 
Se = 936.01255 
t = 5.80774 
Se = 57.47780 
t = 2.14573 
Se = 
t = 
.77280 
-1.87176 
R^ = .154790 
APPENDIX 12 
GROSS VALUE tlARKETED OUTPUT OF MAJOR CROPS 
£ million 
in 
Current Prices 
1954 1959 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
(Estimate) 
1972 
Coffee 5.46 9.53 14.99 13.11 18.62 14.00 12.27 16.16 21.81 18.92 23.12 
Cattle, calves 
for slaughter 2.20 4.26 4.80 9.37 10.92 11.33 11.67 12.22 13.32 13.33 16.51 
Tea 2.06 4.46 7.72 7.33 9.91 8.93 9.34 11.16 13.84 11.80 16.03 
Dairy -
Milk 
only 
2.43 
Milk 
only 
3.17 
4.73 5.66 6.38 7.13 6.10 6.81 9.30 11.65 
Maize 5.97 2.58 1.90 1.85 2.40 5.22 5.41 3.86 2.83 4.28 7.25 
Wheat 3.86 2.70 3.69 4.14 3.48 4.58 6.64 6.58 4.99 5.21 4.16 
Pyrethrum 0.62 1.43 0.99 1.55 2.53 2.70 2.62 1.32 1.48 2.42 3.53 
Sugar 0.28 0.72 1.18 1.54 0.99 1.60 2.18 2.94 3.51 3.46 3.04 
Sisal 2.24 3.71 7.16 3.92 3.09 2.39 2.19 2.25 1.72 1.52 2.36 
Source; Heyer, J. (1973): "Beneath Kenya's Agricultural Boom", African Development, 
September 1973, African Buyer and Trader Publications Ltd., London, p.K20. 
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MAP 2: AREA COVERED BY MAP 1 
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MAP 3 iKIRINYAGA DISTRICT 
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